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INTRODUCTION

Reform of the federal criminal law is a project of awesome scope and
complexity entailing not merely legal considerations but also sensitivity to history, politics, social psychology, penology and the religious, ethnic and economic tensions within this nation. The reform project must conform with that
remarkable structure for resolving tensions, the Constitution of the United
States. It is difficult enough to coordinate the wills of 220 million Americans
in regard to even one of the many emotion-stirring issues of penal law, such
as capital punishment, gun control, abortion, obscenity, probation, parole, organized crime, traffic in narcotic and other drugs, espionage, riot control,
wire-tapping or bail. To bring Congress to agreement simultaneously on a
myriad of changes, each of which will be regarded by some as progress and
by others as catastrophe, would appear to require a political miracle. Why
should such a Herculean task be undertakep? What is the main direction of
reform? What are the toughest issues to resolve, the chief obstacles to be
overcome? What are the prospects?
This article will describe the reform project in the setting of controversy:
the clash between three versions of reform. The first was the Proposed
Federal Criminal Code recommended in the Final Report of the National
Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws. That Commission will be
referred to herein as the Brown Commission, after its Chairman, Governor
Edmund G. Brown of California. Its proposed code will be referred to as the
Commission Code.
A second version of the reform was embodied in bills numbered S. 1 in
the Ninety-third and Ninety-fourth Congresses. This version was sponsored
chiefly by Senators McClellan of Arkansas and Hruska of Nebraska, conservative members of the Brown Commission and dominant members of the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary. The supporters of this bill will occasionally be referred to as "the
Right." Following submission of the Brown Commission Report to Congress
and the President, the Subcommittee held extensive hearings1 and published
1. Hearings on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and
Procedures oJ the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. through 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971-75) [hereinafter cited as SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS].

Page 1: Winter 1977]

FEDERAL REFORM

a three-volume proposed Report of the Judiciary Committee, of which Volume I is S. 1 of the Ninety-fourth Congress, the version of S. I usually referred to in this article. That version of S. 1, was a blend of the original S. 12
and S. 1400,1 which was the Administration bill prepared by the Department
of Justice. S. 1 closely resembled the Commission Code in form and in most
of its substance, but it was overlaid by numerous "hard-line" changes that
evoked powerful opposition. The latest bill, that of January 15, 1975, is the
version reported by the Subcommittee to the full Committee on the Judiciary,
and has itself been modified by numerous subsequent proposed and agreed
changes. Since it was clearly a draft in transition, it seems advantageous to
focus on the earlier version, highlighting the issues itposed starkly.
I summarized my reaction to S. I as follows in a memorandum on "Shortcomings of the McClellan Bill, S. I":'
It can be said generally of the contrasts between S. 1 and the Brown
Commission proposals that S. I expresses the view that the crime problem can
and should be solved by extending government's power over individuals. This
extension can take the form of wiretapping and other secret surveillance, of
giving broad discretion to officials in decisions about punishment, of authorizing exceptionally severe sentences, or of restricting access to critical information about government operations. The other school of thought, represented
by the Brown Commission, is skeptical about the gains in law enforcement
that can be expected from such measures, and more concerned about impairing the qjuality of civil life by needless restraints on liberty.

Contrary to the position of "the Left" described below, however, I believed
that S. I contained much that was valuable, derived from the Brown Commission Code, and that the repugnant provisions of S. 1 could easily be excised
by amendment.
The third version of penal reform was that of the National Committee
Against Repressive Legislation

(NCARL) and the American Civil Liberties

Union, strongly supported by the National Lawyers Guild. I shall refer to this
group as "the Left." The Left's version was only belatedly drafted in bill
form5 because the Left's political position was that S. 1 was so pervasively
reactionary that it could not be saved by amendment; yet their bills were inevitably and obviously revisions of S. 1. No hearings were held or scheduled
on these bills. Basically, the Left did not push an alternative reform; it concentrated on a campaign to stop S. 1.

2. S. 1, 93d Cong., IstSess. (1973), reprinted in
(1973).

SUBCOMMITTEE

HEARINGS.

Part V, at 4211

3. S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS, Part V, at 4862
(1973). See id. at 4205 (1973) (remarks of Senator McClellan).
4. Schwartz, Criminal Code: Shortcomings of the McClellan Bill, S. 1, 17 CIM. L. REP. (BNA)

3203 (July 16, 1975), reprinted in SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS, Part XII, at 384 (1975).
5. H.R. 10,850, 94th Cong., IstSess. (1975); H.R. 12,504, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
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I
ORGANIZATION AND GOALS OF REFORM

A.

Organization for Reform

As I presently see it-for I came to this formulation near the end of my
twenty-year involvement in penal reform rather than at the beginning-the
main goal of penal reform is to promote respect for the law by making law
respectable. This means that the reform must provide for fairer and more
effective administration of justice in accordance with modern ideas. Obsolete
offenses must be eliminated; inconsistent penalties must be reconciled; opportunities for arbitrary action must be narrowed; technical obstacles to conviction must be suppressed; severe penalties must be provided (and reserved) for
offenses which today pose the greatest threats to society. In addition, the purview of the F.B.I. and the rest of the massive machinery of federal justice
must be restricted to criminality of national significance, leaving responsibility
for local law and order to the states and communities.
A few concrete illustrations of the foregoing generalizations will clarify the
meaning of the goal of "making the law respectable." Under current law,
which provides no guidelines for sentencing and no appeal against arbitrary
sentence, two men who have committed identical offenses may find themselves in adjoining federal prison cells serving outrageously different sentences, while a third like offender is granted probation and never goes to
prison at all. Similarly, under current law a man who perpetrates a vast fraud,
in the course of which he sends a letter through the United States mail, is
liable to a maximum federal penalty of five years; 6 another swindler whose
loot is petty but who in the course of the scheme sends three letters is subject
to a maximum of three times five years, or fifteen years.7 Current federal
rape legislation does not differentiate between savage attacks by strangers and
so-called "date-rape," that is, intercourse between voluntary companions
which may indeed have been forced but only following tolerated sexual
foreplay.' Finally, trivial involvement of the telephone or other instrumentality of interstate commerce makes a "federal case" of innumerable petty local
misdemeanors. Such grotesqueries undermine belief in the rationality of the
system, and encourage the view that there is nothing immoral in trying to
beat the system, whether the attempt is made by offenders or by defense
lawyers.
The urge to make criminal law intellectually respectable by replacing the
absurdities and anachronisms of prevailing law with rationality and consis-

6.

See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).

7.
8.

See note 74 infra.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2031 (1970).
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tency was expressed in the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute.'
The Model Penal Code triggered a powerful movement for reform of the
state criminal codes ° and was a progenitor of the federal reform. Many criticisms of current penal law had been documented in The Challenge of Crime in a
Free Society, the landmark Report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice." A National Commission on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws was established by Congress in 1966, t 2 in
response to pressure on the Johnson administration to "do something" about
13
the "crime wave." The statute directed the Commission to carry out:
a full and complete review and study of the statutory and case law of the

United States which constitutes the federal system of criminal justice for the
purpose of formulating and recommending to the Congress legislation which
would improve the federal system of criminal justice. It shall be the further
duty of the Commission to make recommendations for revision and recodification of the criminal laws of the United States, including repeal of unnecessary or undesirable statutes and such changes in the penalty structure as the
Commission may feel will better serve the ends of justice.

The bipartisan Commission was composed of three members of the Senate
Judiciary Committee (Senators McClellan, Hruska and Ervin), three members
of the House Judiciary Committee (Representatives Kastenmeier of Wisconsin, Poff of Virginia and Edwards of California, who was replaced by Mikva
of Illinois), three federal judges (Judges Edwards of the Sixth Circuit, Higginbotham of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and MacBride of the Eastern
District of California), and three presidential appointees (former Governor
Brown and attorneys Donald Scott Thomas of Austin, Texas and Theodore
Voorhees of Washington, D.C.). 4
There was a fifteen-member Advisory Committee, headed by former
Attorney General and Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark. Among the advisors were prosecutors, defense lawyers, police officials and experts in penology and constitutional law. 1 5 Elliot L. Richardson, who had been U.S. Attorney in Boston and Attorney General of Massachusetts before going on to
cabinet and ambassadorial posts, was a member and spoke eloquently for
9. See MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
10. See SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS, Part 11, at 558-59 (1971) (remarks of Professor Wechsler
reporting on the status of state penal law revision); Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the
United States: The Model Penal Code, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1425 (1968).
11. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967).
12. Pub. L. No. 89-801, 80 Stat. 1516 (1966).
13. Id. § 3.
14. For biographical summaries and identification of other members who served for a time,
see NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT,

at 361 (197

15.

1)

[hereinafter cited as COMMISSION FINAL REPORT].
See COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, Appendix C, at 363.

Appendix B,
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reform.' " Leading members of the staff were likewise experienced prosecutors and defense lawyers. 7 Staff work was supplemented by special reports
from expert consultants of every shade of opinion on particularly difficult
issues. I8

Perhaps the most preliminary decision of the Brown Commission was to
recognize a disparity between the breadth of the statutory mandate and the
three-year deadline which Congress set for the Commission. Interpreting the
broad scope of the mandate as defining a range within which the Commission
could select the most useful projects, I proposed, as Director of the Commission, that we draft a new federal substantive code. This meant that we would
lay aside the divisive procedural issues, such as wire-tapping, over which Congress had fiercely and recently debated."9 It was evident that if we undertook
to recanvass these issues we would spend three years continuing a recent acrimonious debate, and in the end say nothing new or authoritative.
The three-year deadline imposed a healthy urgency upon the Commission's work: we would do the best we could in the available time, abjuring
the extensions that such projects are typically afforded. 20 There are no
natural limits to an enterprise of this sort, and perfection is an illusory goal.
The Germans, for example, spent about a century attempting to perfect their
proposed penal code. 2 The American Law Institute deliberated for almost
two decades on the Model Penal Code without even reaching such difficult
16. In a speech to an Orientation Conference of U.S. Attorneys in Washington, on August 1,
1969, he related the mounting problem of criminal law enforcement to a general erosion of
authority, whether of parents or governments, and to over-extension of penal prohibitions into
areas of private morals. He concluded:
The ultimate test must lie in the law's capacity to enlist rational understanding and
voluntary compliance. It is through applying this test that a body such as the National
Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, for which I had the privilege of serving on the Advisory Committee, renders its most important service....
• . . Having recognized that rationality and the skepticism which it has generated have
contributed to the erosion of our system of order, we find in the end that our only
sensible course is to invoke a deeper skepticism and a more constructive rationality. For
it will take skepticism to identify those parts of the system that no longer make sense in a
modern society, and it will take rationality to strengthen those elements of the system
that are necessary to decent order among us.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, STUDY DRAFr OF A NEW FEDERAL

CRIMINAL CODE ixiv (1970) [hereinafter cited as Study Draft].

17. The Director had been a section chief in the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of
Justice. Deputy Director Richard A. Green had had extensive experience as Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Southern District of New York, and thereafter as a defense attorney.
18. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, 1, 2 WORKING PAPERS
(1970) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION WOR.xINc. PAPERS].
19. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970);
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 3504 (1970).
20. A one-year extension plus a sixty-day wind-up period was granted, Pub. L. No. 91-39, 83
Stat. 44 (1969), allowing us time to take account of public response to the Study Draft which, clue
to printing delays, was not widely circulated until June, 1970. The extension also compensated
for the six months required to organize the Commission and its staff.
21. See A. SCHONKE & H. SCHRODER, STRAFGESETZBUCH-KOMMENTAR 1-5 (8th ed. 1976).
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matters as drug control, gambling, organized crime, political offenses and
regulatory offenses. Commentaries to the Model Penal Code have not yet
been published, mainly because it has proved impossible to keep up with the
immense flux of penal developments in Congress and the fifty states, developments which seemingly should be related to the Code text. The efforts
that had gone into the Model Penal Code saved us years of original work. We
treated the Model Penal Code as a presumptively acceptable tentative draft
for a federal penal code, and drew heavily from the comments in the tentative drafts.

2

1

Different groups have disparate goals, which in a democracy must be
compromised and recurrently rebalanced. As the community's economic, social and ethical character evolves, the "perfect" code, promulgated after ten or
twenty-five years of deliberation, will already be obsolescent. 23 The need,
then, is to inject into the political and legislative consciousness the maximum
feasible dose of accumulated knowledge and skill, rather than to engage in
interminable philosophical and sociological inquiries.
An additional benefit of a relatively short deadline is that it tends to give
the draftsmen a useful lead over the political forces which will eventually be
marshalled against innovation. The California reform experience is enlightening in this connection. Before a draft could be completed, the project was
aborted by politicians fearful of the possible electoral consequences of proposals to decriminalize private adult sexual behavior and use of marijuana.24
A protracted reform process makes each issue stand out as crucial, deprives
particular proposals of the logical support provided by the entire context of
the code, and magnifies the effectiveness of single-issue opposition groups,
who are happy to hold a comprehensive reform hostage to satisfaction of
their narrow concerns.
The three-year deadline also meant that we would not spend out time and
the government's money trying to identify "the cause of crime." This decision
seems so obviously correct as to be hardly worth mention, except for a criti22.

An excellent review of state experience in drafting reform codes appears in SUBCOM-

Mi'I-EF HEARINGS, Part 11 (1971).

23. Consider, for example, the rapid evolution of views regarding the application of criminal
law to private sexual relations and abortion. In 1959. the American Law Institute made the moderately liberal proposal to legalize abortions where a physician, with the concurrence of another
doctor, believes "there is a substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy Would gravely impair the physical or mental health of the mother or that the child would be born with grave
physical or mental defect... " MODL PENAL CODE § 207.11 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). Although
this proposal evoked conservative outrage at the time, it later proved to be unconstitutionally
restrictive. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing woman's right to abortion for any
reason during first trimester of pregnancy).
24. See Sherry, Criminal Law Revision in California, 4 U. MICH. J.L. RFORNi 429 (1971),
reprinted in SUBCOMmrr-EEE H EARINGS, Part 11, at 623 (197 1); Skolnick, Impediments to Criminal Law
Reform: California, 1963-70, in SuicO,.Nirr-E HEARINGS, Part II, at 654 (197 1); Letter of Professor
Herbert T. Packer, 22 SrAN. L. RFv. 160 (1969); For the Record, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REV. vii (1969)
(unbound volume only).
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cism voiced in one quarter that the Commission should have begun its work
with the sociological investigation. 25 Criminal law reform has, and I dare say
ever will have, a full agenda if it addresses itself to manifest abuses, inequalities, cruelties and anachronisms. Centuries of investigation into the
etiology of crime have produced a marvelous array of explanations, including
genetic defect, family disorganization, psychosexual compulsions, capitalist
oppression, peer group pressures, the criminogenic tendencies of the penal
system itself and, no doubt among fringe groups, sunspots and diet. The
lawyer-legislator cannot wait for the conclusion of this endless effort of humanity to psychoanalyze itself. The practical question facing those responsible
for legislation and government is what can we do meanwhile, before we know
definitely either what causes crime in general or the particular cause for each
of the infinite variety of crimes.
Early on, we decided to publish a preliminary study draft. 26 The reasons

were legal, political and strategic. The legal and political aspects can be passed
over quickly. Our enabling legislation called for "interim reports to the President and the Congress at such times as the Commission may deem appropriate, and in any event within two years .... "27 The Study Draft was our
compliance. 28 For political reasons-and I do not use the phrase pejoratively-the Commission had to afford opportunity for pre-publication comment on our code by legislators, judges, prosecutors, the organized bar,
government agencies and lobbyists of all sorts. The Study Draft provided that
25. The Report of the Special Committee on the Proposed New Federal Criminal Law of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York on the Brown Commission Code began with a
criticism that "without an investigation of the agonizing root causes of crime, an effective penal
code cannot be constructed." SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS, Part Ill, subpt. D, at 3478 (1972). See
N.Y. Times, July 5, 1972, at 27, col. 5. Despite this introduction to its Report. the Association's
position was quite favorable to the Commission's proposals, while offering a number of carefully
considered criticisms of particular provisions.
26. STUDY DRAFT. For a statement of the aims and main features of the draft, see id.at xxv.
The draft was introduced to the legal community by a series of articles. See Brown & Schwartz,
New Federal Criminal Code is Submitted, 56 A.B.A.J. 844 (1970), reprinted in SUBCOMMI-rTEE
HEARINGS, Part I, at 50 (1971); Brown & Schwartz, Sentencing Under the Draft Federal Code, 56
A.B.A.J. 935 (1970), reprinted in SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS, Part 1, at 56 (1971); Brown &
Schwartz, Ofenses Redefined Under Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 56 A.B.A.J. 1181 (1970),
reprinted in SUBCOMtMITEE HEARINGS, Part 1,at 78 (1971); McClellan, Codification, Reform and
Revision: The Challenge of a Modern Federal Criminal Code, 1971 DUKE L.J. 663.
27. Pub. L. No. 89-801, § 8, 80 Stat. 1516 (1966).
28. The Commission filed one other substantive interim report on March 17, 1969, recommending a standard immunity provision to replace the scores of divergent immunity provisions in
existing law. The recommendation favored "use immunity" rather than "transactional immunity."
The proposal was enacted in Title II of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 6001-6005 (1970). Although this looks like an excursion beyond the Commission's chosen field
of substantive reform to a controversial procedural issue, the fact that "transactional immunity" is
a defense rather than a rule of evidence brought the issue plausibly within the Commission's
self-imposed subject-matter limitation. The position taken clearly constituted a bid by the Commission for the confidence of the "law-and-order" elements among its own members and in Congress.
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formal opportunity. This publication can be characterized more as political
necessity than information-gathering because the Commission expected and
received little new information after publication of the Study Draft; earlier
informal staff contacts and the experience of Commission members, staff and
the Advisory Committee had covered the ground.
The strategic importance of publishing an interim draft was considerable.
In the first place, it compelled us to produce a complete draft well in advance
of our deadline. That seemed the best way to avoid bogging down on those
issues with which we happened to start our work. The experience of the drafters of the Model Penal Code had shown that in a large project time tends to
be allocated not according to the importance of particular topics but according to the order in which topics are taken up. The first topics, however unimportant, swallow up massive fractions of time and energy simply because
the participants have the impression that a great deal of time remains. Toward the end of the project, enormously difficult and important issues get
summary disposition in the face of tomorrow's printing deadline. Having a
complete draft long before that deadline provides an interval during which
attention can be given to reworking the most crucial provisions.
A second reason for early formulation of a complete draft is that solid
decisions cannot be made while drafting one provision of a code without
knowing how other provisions are going to be handled. What is the general
scheme of prison terms within which theft penalties are to be fitted? Is there
to be a general section on "solicitation," or must each substantive section deal
independently with solicitation to commit the specific offense? If the section
dealing with attempt provides for penalties at a lower level than for completed offenses, shall this policy be rejected or qualified in particular applications, such as theft or burglary, where the definition of the crime embraces
much behavior that, analytically, amounts to attempt?
Another strategic consideration in favor of preparing a complete tentative
draft is that the staff enjoys more freedom and can proceed more rapidly
than would be possible if the Commission had to be fully persuaded at every
stage of progress. The Commission was composed of very busy people. Meetings could not be scheduled more frequently than once in two months, and
some members could not attend regularly or throughout the day or days of a
scheduled meeting. There was a natural tendency to defer serious consideration until the last moment when final decisions had to be made. A study draft
in which no decision purports to be final is well adapted to such a situation.
Commission members could take a more relaxed attitude toward proposals
they might later come to view with alarm. Not only would the staff be allowed
more leeway in a study draft, but a draft in being would enjoy a certain
tactical advantage in subsequent Commission debates.
Not surprisingly, the Study Draft was somewhat more radical than the
Final Draft. The members of the Commission who were well aware of the
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strategy of the situation (a) reviewed the Study Draft provisions scrupulously;
(b) changed its proposed title from "Tentative Draft" (which was functionally
accurate) to the more noncommittal "Study Draft"; (c) overrode the Director
on some points and required inclusion in the Study Draft of alternative positions espoused by minority members; 9 and (d) insisted on a declaration in
boldfaced type on the cover that "The Study Draft provisions are not to be
taken as representing the position of the Commission on any particular issue."
Significantly, as the printing deadline for the Final Report approached, some
members of the Commission, notably Senators McClellan and Hruska, became
increasingly reluctant to be bound even by the Commission's tentative decisions. At the same time, however, they desired to strengthen the impetus toward revision of the federal penal code by having the Commission submit a
"unanimous" report. The result was "unanimous" support of the Final Draft
"as a work basis upon which the Congress may undertake the necessary reform ....

Individually we have reservations, sometimes strong, on the resolu-

tion of particular issues."3"' Like the Study Draft, the Final Report articulated
alternatives favored by minority members (usually conservative). Not surprisingly, these minority positions came to supersede the Commission's majority
views when the Senate Subcommittee revised the Commission's Code for incorporation in S. 1.
The Commission's Final Report was delivered on February 10, 1971, in a
formal ceremony in the Hearing Room of the Senate Judiciary Committee
amid a chorus of approbation and mutual congratulations." Attorney General
John Mitchell accepted it for President Nixon, going so far as to dismiss as
"nonsense" a criticism already heard in some quarters that the jurisdictional
provisions of the Commission's Code were too comprehensive, overrode
states' rights, and portended the creation of a vast "federal police. '32 The
29. See, e.g., STUD, DRAFr, ch. 36 (capital punishment); id. §§ 1005, 3203 (special sentencing
for organized crime); id. § 3204 (sentences up to one year for misdemeanors, where the Director
favored from one to three months); id. § 405(1)(b) (proposal for class actions to reimburse victims
of corporate crime, deleted in final code). For a full list of changes between the Study Draft and
the Final Report, see COMMISSION FINAL REPORT 343.
30. Letter from Edmund G. Brown to the President and Congress (Jan. 7, 1971), reprinted in
COMMISSION FINAL REPORT i.
31. See SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS, Part I, at

1-128 (1971).

32.

See Liebmann, Charteringa National Police Force, 56 A.B.A.J. 1070, 1071 (1970), reprinted in
SUBCOMMIrEE HEARINGS, Part I, at 64 (197 1):

From these modest beginnings there has sprung forth a monster. The proposed study
draft works not a revision and rearrangement of the federal criminal code ... but rather
a wholesale expansion of federal police power and a wholesale destruction of state responsibility and state autonomy in the preservation of public order and the administration of criminal law.
See also Resolution of the National Association of Attorneys General, in SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS,
Part I, at 6, 9 (1971). These critics were primarily concerned by § 201(b) of the Commission
Code, the so-called "piggyback" provision-which allows federal prosecution of all crimes involved in a single episode if federal jurisdiction exists for any of the crimes. The response to this
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Attorney General's epithet was entirely appropriate, but it was prudently excised from the stenographic transcript of the proceedings. That was the first
small retreat from the Brown Commission.
Under President Nixon's instructions, the Department of Justice began the
study and revision of the Commission Code 33 which would lead to the administration bill, S. 1400, in the Ninety-third Congress. Senator McClellan,
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, instituted the monumental consideration of the
Commission Code that eventuated in S. 1. The priority which Senator McClellan was prepared to assign to revision of the penal code is suggested by the
bill number which he secured for it; it may be recalled that S. 2 in the
Ninety-third Congress dealt with no trivial matter-liquidation of the Vietnam
War.3 4 The clever, scholarly and indefatigable Professor G. Robert Blakey,
who had been in effect counsel to the conservatives on the Brown Commission, was put in charge of the staff of the Subcommittee project.
The Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Judiciary Committee,
although dominated by liberal representatives, including Representatives Kastenmeier and Edwards who had served on the Brown Commission, was not
prepared to move so fast. The Commission Code was duly embodied in a bill,
H.R. 330, but no hearings were scheduled. The reasons for this were mixed
and obscure. Some had to do with conflicts of priorities in the House
Judiciary Committee.3a 1 There was also a feeling in some quarters that the
conservative thrust of the Senate could be most effectively countered by waiting out the battle there between conservatives and liberals, after which the
Senate's version could be bottled up or cut up in the House. Some felt that
postponing action until a Democratic President and a new Congress convened
in 1977 would assure a better product as well as credit to the Democrats.

criticism is twofold: First, the section is simply one element in a catalogue of available jurisdictional bases and is inoperative except as explicitly adopted in a substantive section of the code;
second, the provision does not expand current federal jurisdiction. Existing federal law follows
the "piggyback" principle quite haphazardly, as in provisions for life imprisonment where "death
results" in connection with malicious mischief to interstate vehicles, 18 U.S.C. § 34 (1970), or civil
rights offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(5) (1970), and provisions for the imposition of the death
penalty where a killing occurs in connection with a bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) (1970).
33. Representatives of the Department had, of course, followed the Commission's deliberations closely, attending meetings as observers and commenting informally on staff drafts. Ronald
F. Gainer, Director of the Justice Department's Office of Policy and Planning and an able, experienced and perceptive public servant, was the Department's principal liaison officer with the
Commission and was subsequently put in charge of the Department's work on the penal reform
legislation.
34. S. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971) (a bill "to Provide for the Cessation of Bombing in
Indochina and for the Withdrawal of U.S. Military Personnel from the Republic of Viet Nam,
Cambodia and Laos").
35. Among other extensive and controversial projects occupying the Committee during the
relevant period were the revision of the copyright law, review of the proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, and impeachment of President Nixon.
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House liberals were content for the moment, therefore, to go along with the
movement to defeat S. 1 by sponsoring the belated and hastily drafted alternative bills H.R. 10850 and H.R. 12504.36 The pressure of these bills helped
to discourage a crucial and suprisingly liberal compromise that seemed about
to emerge in the Senate in the spring of 1976.
B.

Basic Policy: Deterrence; Role of Retribution

The Commission embarked on the reform project with the generally
shared hypothesis that, whatever the ultimate causes of crime may be, a
counter-incentive should be provided by a system of threats of punishment.
Deterrence or, more broadly, prevention, is thus the basic policy that underlies the Code, although the Code's statement of purposes, which is intended
to guide interpretation and administration of the statute, includes not only
3 7
rehabilitation but also retribution.
The draftsmen did not, of course, entertain the naive notion that all
crimes are deterrable. There are crimes of passion and partiotism that seem
virtually undeterrable. There are also people who commit offenses precisely
because of a desire to suffer consequences or to savor extreme risks. Perhaps
we should not even regard such desires as pathological, seeing that "sane"
men climb Mt. Everest, but merely register the observation that the number
of risk-seeking offenders is so small as not to count in any formulation of
general penal policy. It is worth remembering that even in insane asylums
(read "hospitals" if so inclined) dealing with minimally deterrable people,
rules and sanctions are used to promote essential decency and order.
It is widely believed that most human activity-indeed, most animal activity-is governed by a pleasure-pain calculus. On that hypothesis society
bases not only its deterrent penal codes, but also its entire system of affirmative awards: profits for entrepreneurs, salary increases for bureaucrats, Nobel
Prizes for scientists and artists, patents for inventors, tax incentives for investment in petroleum exploration, prizes and scholarships for academic
achievers and so on. It is just as well to believe that these contingent rewards
36. See notes 245-63 infra and accompanying text.
37. "-l']he provisions of this Code are intended ... to achieve the following objectives: (a) to
insure the public safety through (i) vindication of public norms by the imposition of merited
punishment: (ii) the deterrent influence of the penalties . .. provided; (iii) the rehabilitation of
those convicted .... ." Proposed New Federal Criminal Code, in NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT § 102 (1971) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION
CODE].

S. I recited approximately the same range of goals, but manifested a priority for retribution by
prescribing "sanctions . . . that will assure just punishment. S. 1, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 101(b)
(1974) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as S. 1].
See also the critical departures of S. I from the Commission Code in regard to standards for
probation and parole, discussed at text accompanying notes 177-85 & 191-93 infra.
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do not influence attitudes and behavior as to reject the deterrent hypothesis
in criminal law.

38

In the Commission Code, if not in S. 1, retribution serves its classic and
least objectionable function of setting limits on the state's power to punish. It
is this notion that underlies, for example, the declared policies in favor of
requiring proof of "culpability" 39 and in favor of the defense of insanity. 4° It
is often forgotten that the saying "an eye for an eye; a tooth for a tooth" was
in its time a policy of moderation, for the alternative was likely to be capital
punishment for mere wounding or theft. So also in our day, when many people insist on extreme penalties as essential to security or mandated by Holy
Writ, the common man's sense of "proportionality" (i.e. retribution) serves to
minimize the scope of application of those penalties, for example, by excluding capital punishment for attempted murder4 1 and for non-homicidal of42

fenses.

In any event, retribution as a goal of the criminal law could not, as a
practical matter, be excluded from a democratically enacted code in this country, where massive popular support for retribution has recently been demonstrated by the surge of capital punishment legislation following the Supreme
Court's invalidation of older arbitrary procedures for imposing it. 43 Justice
Stewart's opinion in Gregg v. Georgia,44 sustaining Georgia's revised capital
punishment procedures, restores to retribution a legitimacy which it had
begun to lose, at least in some professional circles:4' In part, capital punishment is an expression of society's moral outrage at
particularly offensive conduct. This function may be unappealing to many,
38. See J. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE
DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973).

(1974);

F.

ZIMRING

& J.

HAWKINS,

39. The Commission Code provides that guilt without culpability shall exist only where the
statute expressly so permits, COMMISSION CODE § 302(2), and that criminal negligence, as distinguished from civil negligence, requires proof of a "gross deviation from acceptable standards of
conduct." Id. § 302(l)(d)1. S. 1 substitutes the non-committal phrase "state of mind" for "culpability." S. I § 301, and does not insist on an explicit statutory basis for strict liability for the
numerous regulatory offenses outside the criminal code. Id. § 303(a)(1)(B)(1).
40. COMMISSION CODE § 503. S. I permits only limited use of the insanity defense. S. I § 522.
See Part IV. B. infra.

41.

For a sophisticated analysis that would, on deterrent grounds, equate the penalties for

murder and attempted murder, see Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the
Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497 (1974).

42. Most states do not penalize rape or armed robbery by capital punishment, and ithas now
been questioned whether statutes that do provide such penalties are invalid under the eighth and
fourteenth amendments. See Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2932 n.35 (1976), (reserving
judgment as to whether capital punishment is unconstitutionally "disproportionate" to such offenses).
43. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The ensuing legislative response is summarized
in Gregg v.Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2928-29 (1976).
44. 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976).
45. Id. at 2930, quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972); Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) (footnotes omitted).
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but it is essential in an ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on legal
processes rather than self-help to vindicate their wrongs. "The instinct for

retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct in the
administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting
the stability of a society governed by law. When people begin to believe that
organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders

the punishment they 'deserve,' then are sown the seeds of anarchy--of selfhelp, vigilante justice, and lynch law ...Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law, but neither is it a forbidden objective nor
one inconsistent with our respect for the dignity of men." Indeed, the decision
that capital punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is
an expression of the community's belief that certain crimes are themselves so
grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the
penaly of death.
In vain did Justice Marshall, dissenting with Justice Brennan, point out
that life imprisonment might well be regarded, in the United States as in most
advanced western civilizations, as adequate "expression of [society's] moral
outrage. "46 The frightening implications of the proposition that society may
be as cruel to the despised criminal as he "deserves" are only partially mitigated by Justice Stewart's concurrent declaration that punishment must not be
"excessive" or inconsistent with "the dignity of man," the "basic concept un-

derlying the Eighth Amendment. 47 We shall see that a fundamental cleavage
between S. 1 and the Commission Code is over the emphasis to be given to
retribution.
Rehabilitation is a declared goal of S. 1 as well as the Commission Code,
notwithstanding growing skepticism as to the feasibility of reconstructing
character in a penal setting. 4 At the least, efforts should be made, during a
period of incarceration mandated for other purposes, to educate, motivate
and resocialize the offender. The goal of rehabilitation also mandates concern
that the circumstances of detention and the length of imprisonment not be
destructive of the personality of prisoners.
II
SOME COMMON

GROUND: CONSENSUS REFORMS

My detailed criticisms of S. 1 and S. 1400 have been published elsewhere. 49 What may usefully be done here, before going on to identify crucial

46.
47.

Id. at 2976 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
Id. at 2925, (quoting Trop v.Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).
48. See M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 86-102 (1973); Allen,
CriminalJustice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitation Ideal, 50 J. CRIMc L.C. & P.S. 226 (1959).
49. See Schwartz, supra note 4; Schwartz, The Proposed FederalCriminal Code, The Administration's
Bill, S. 1400, 13 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 3265 (1973) reprinted in SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS, Part X,
at 6980 (1974). See also Schwartz, The Proposed Federal Criminal Code, Comparison of S. I and the
Recommendations of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, in SUBCOMMITTEE
HEARINGS, Part V, at 5380 (1973).
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issues that remain to be resolved, is to outline the progressive elements which
S. 1 adopted from the Commission Code, or even added to it, and with respect to which a substantial consensus already exists.
A.

Basic Structure of the Code; Federal Jurisdiction

All agree that the United States, which has never before had a comprehensive, logically organized and internally consistent penal code, shall now
have one. In place of the present Title 18 of the United States Code, which is
merely an assembly of ancient and new provisions arranged alphabetically
with little regard to the content of successive chapters, the new code will have
50
three main divisions. These will deal, respectively, with general matters,
specific offenses 51 and the sentencing system. 52 The General Part will cover
federal jurisdiction (that is, the scope of application of the federal code); 53
definitions (never before undertaken by Congress) of "intention," "recklessness, 55"1 negligence,"5'6 exculpating "mistake, ' ' 57 "insanity," 58 and other elements
of mens rea;5 9 the liability of accomplices 60 and corporations; 61 the statute of
limitations; 62 and other similar matters.

The very important problems of justification and excuse would also be
dealt with in the General Part.6 3 These defenses to prosecution have heretofore been totally disregarded by Congress, so that the courts have had to
develop the law on a case-by-case basis, predictably producing inconsistencies
and ambiguities. 64 Since the operational effect of a penal provision results
from a combination of prohibition and exceptions or defenses, it is strange
and potentially unconstitutional on grounds of vagueness to have criminal
laws say, in effect, "Thou shalt not do X . .. except as the courts qualify this
prohibition by recognizing justifications and excuses." On the other hand, the
issues of justification and excuse are perplexing, and penal theory in this area
is primitive. We shall see below that, while there is agreement that the Code

50. See COMMISSION CODE §§ 101-709; S. 1 §§ 101-552.
51. See COMMISSION CODE §§ 1001-1861; S. 1 §§ 1001-1863; Brown and Schwartz, Offenses Redefined Under Proposed Federal Criminal Code, supra note 26, at 78.
52. See COMMISSION CODE §§ 3001-3604; S. 1 §§ 2001-2403.
53. See COMMISSION CODE §§ 201-219; S. 1 §§ 201-205.

54.
55.
56.
57.

COMMISSION CODE
COMMISSION CODE
COMMISSION CODE
COMMISSION CODE

§ 302(1)(a); S. 1 § 302(a).
§ 302(1)(k); S. I § 302(c).
§ 302(1)(d); S. 1 § 302(d).
§ 609; S. 1 § 521.
§ 503; S. I § 522.

58. COMMISSION CODE
59. See generally COMMISSION CODE §§ 301-305; S. I §§ 301-303.
60. COMMISSION CODE § 401; S. I § 401.
61.
62.

§§ 402-403; S. I § 402.
§ 701; S. I § 511.
63.
§§ 601-610, 619; S. I §§ 521-523, 531, 541-544, 551-552.
64. One such example is the insanity defense. At present, at least five different formulas are
being utilized in the federal courts. See 1 COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS 22947.
COMMISSION CODE
COMMISSION CODE
COMMISSION CODE
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should address itself to defining the defenses, very sharp controversy remains
65
as to how far to go along that road.
The problems of federal penal jurisdiction may be analyzed under four
main headings: (1) the core of the federal government's power to preserve
itself and carry out federal functions (herein are treason, espionage, tax and
customs violations, etc.); (2) the territorial scope within which federal legislative power is plenary (federal enclaves, American vessels on the high seas) and
where the federal penal code would be, in principle, as comprehensive as that
of an ordinary state; (3) the question of "assimilated crimes"-state-defined
offenses which Congress adopts by reference for application in federal
enclaves;6 6 and (4) the question of the extent to which Congress should, by
using its constitutional power (for example, over interstate commerce or the
mails), make federal crimes out of behavior that is already penalized by state
law.
Only this last category of federal jurisdiction calls for discussion here. I
have described and sought to rationalize this federal auxiliary criminal jurisdiction elsewhere.6 7 It came into existence in the nineteenth century to deal
with multi-state crime, notably large-scale frauds. Initially, the thought was
simply to deny the use of federal facilities, for example, the mails or facilities
of interstate communications or commerce, to those who would employ them
for nefarious purposes. 68 "Use of the mails" to carry out the scheme was conceived of as the "gist" of the "mail fraud" offense,6 9 and every separate use of
the mails was a distinct offense for purposes of prosecution and punishment. 70 The fraudulent operation itself remained theoretically the responsibil7
ity of the states. '

This theoretical nicety had unfortunate practical consequences which will
be eliminated by common consent in the new federal penal code. First, the

65. See notes 150-54, 212-14, 230-46 infra and accompanying text.
66. See 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1970); COMMISSION CODE § 209; S. 1 § 1863. See also 1 COMMISSION
WORKING PAPERS 33, 77-103. Any federal code must incorporate by reference masses of minor
local traffic and other regulations, on which Congress should not waste its time and which in any
event ought ordinarily to conform with the regulations of neighboring non-enclave communities.
67. Schwartz, Federal CriminalJurisdiction and Prosecutors' Discretion, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
64 (1948).
68. See id. at 74-75.
69. See, e.g., Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 315 (1896): "Itis enough if, having devised a scheme to defraud, the defendant with a view of executing it deposits in the post office
letters, which he thinks may assist in carrying it into effect, although in the judgment of the jury
they may be absolutely ineffective therefor." See also Schwartz, supra note 67, at 79: "Courts find
themselves talking nonsense like the oft-repeated declaration that the use of the mails is the 'gist'
of the offense of mail fraud, when all that is meant is that this federal jurisdictional element
must, of course, be alleged and proved" (footnote omitted).
70. See note 74 infra.
71. See Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 389-90 (1960) (a scheme to defraud by misappropriating school district's moneys and property constitutes essentially a state crime and can be
federal only if mails are used for the purpose of executing such a scheme).
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United States found it difficult to extradite fugitive swindlers because extradition treaties generally required that the behavior be penalized in both the
demanding and the extraditing state, and foreign countries knew no such
offense as "mail fraud." Second, since each posting was a separate offense,
federal prosecutors could secure multiple indictments for a single fraud.7 2
The situation was aggravated as the mail fraud statute was amended to permit
prosecution not only for posting but also for causing nefarious mail to be
delivered. 7 3 Since substantial frauds might involve thousands of mailings, the
number of offenses charged and therefore the limits of punishment became
virtually a matter of prosecutorial discretion. Third, when there was a conviction on several counts, some federal judges carried the logic of "mailings-asthe-gist-of-the-offense" to its ridiculous conclusion: not satisfied with the
statutory maximum of five years which Congress had prescribed for mail
fraud, they would impose consecutive five-year sentences for separate mailings. 74 The situation was aggravated by the enactment at different times of federal statutes using different constitutional bases to penalize fraud, extortion,
or dissemination of obscenity .7 Thus, different federal offenses, sometimes
differently penalized, might be committed depending on whether the accused
employed the mail or the interstate telephone, or on whether the contraband
was imported from abroad or transported in interstate commerce. Moreover,
under the doctrine that state and federal governments might both prosecute
and punish identical misbehavior offending their separate "sovereignties,"
the accused were exposed to official abuse of power that violated the spirit if
not the letter of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.7 6 Finally, the inevitable differences between the federal definition of a particular
category of offense and the cognate offense under state law produced
anomalies. For example, unlike the false pretenses statutes of most states, the
federal mail fraud law could be used to punish misrepresentation of opinion,
value, intention, or law. 7 7 The result is that in a strictly local swindle criminal

72. Judicial revulsion against such scholastic excesses mav be seen in Bell v. United States, 249
U.S. 81 (1955) (transport of several women in interstate commerce on a single occasion is a single
offense). But cf. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958) (multiple, different charges based on
a single narcotics transaction).
73. 25 Stat. 873 (1889) (ameidmig 70 Rex. Stat. § 5480 (1878)).
74. See, e.g., Becker v. United States, 91 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1937) (two five-year sentences to
be served consecutively for two letters to the same victim); Beckett v. United States, 84 F.2d 731
(6th Cir. 1936) (cumulating sentences permitted but caution and moderation should rule its exercise); cf Sanders v. United States, 415 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1969) (defendant could have received
maximum consecutive sentences totaling 115 years under multiple count fraud indictment).
75. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1027 (1970) (fraud and false statements); id. §§ 872, 875-877
(1951) (extortion); id. §§ 1461-1464 (obscenity).
76. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (earlier state court conviction does not
bar federal prosecution under the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment).
77. See United States v. Rowe, 56 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1932).
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liability may depend on whether prosecution is undertaken by federal authorities or local prosecutors.
As federal penal legislation proliferated in the twentieth century, it has
become evident that the role of the federal government can no longer be
regarded as merely protecting federal facilities from wrongdoers. In reality
we have two largely overlapping systems of criminal justice. Occasionally, all
pretense of a confined role for the federal government has been abandoned
where plenary federal jurisdiction (not, however, preclusive of parallel state
enforcement)78 is claimed by Congress on the basis of its findings that local,
7 9
interstate and international operations are inextricably intertwined.
The changed role of federal penal law is reflected in both the Commission
Code and S. 1. The definitions of offenses are in terms of conduct and culpability just as in state and foreign national codes. The question of the circumstances under which the federal government may and should intervene is
dealt with separately,8 0 making it impossible any longer to regard the jurisdic78. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 896 (1970) (Organized Crime Control Act):
This chapter [extortionate credit transactions] does not preempt any field of law with
respect to which State legislation would be permissible in the absence of this chapter. No
law of any State legislation would be valid in the absence of this chapter may be held invalid or inapplicable by virtue of the existence of this chapter, and no officer, agency,
or instrumentality of any State may be deprived by virtue of this chapter of any jurisdiction over any offense over which it would have jurisdiction in the absence of this
chapter.
79. See, e.g., Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C.
§ 801 (1970). A similar plenary federal jurisdiction has been asserted in the drive against organized crime. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-894, 896 (1970) (loansharking); cf Perez v. United States,
402 U.S. 14 (1971) (sustaining constitutionality of the loansharking jurisdiction). The Brown
Commission accepted the recently enacted plenary jurisdiction approach to the loansharking offense. See COMMISSION CODE § 1771, Comment, at 238 (timidly proferring the suggestion that
such "jurisdiction may be overbroad").
A like treatment was proposed in S. I for the quite comprehensively defined "racketeering"
crimes (§§ 1801-1804, 1806). In discussing the scope of these crimes, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee Report stated:
This slightly expands current law, which requires that the enterprise be engaged in or
affect interstate or foreign commerce. As a practical matter, virtually every enterprise's
activities under this section would meet the "affect" criterion. However, the Committee
believes that it should not be necessary to show a nexus with interstate commerce in view
of the findings and purpose expressed by Congress in the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970, to the effect that the activities of organized crime in the aggregate have a
substantial adverse impact upon a variety of Federal interests, including but not limited
to interstate and foreign commerce.
3 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE CODIFICATION, REVISION, AND REFORM ACT OF

1974, at 773 (Comm. Print 1974) [herein-

after cited as SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT]. Similalry, S. I utilized the plenary jurisdiction approach for
various drug offenses. See S. 1 §§ 1811 (trafficking in an opiate), 1812 (trafficking in drugs), 1813
(possessing drugs) and 1814 (violating a drug regulation).
80. In the Commission Code, the twelve "common jurisdictional bases" are catalogued in section 201. Thereafter, a simple cross-reference in each substantive offense section serves to designate the particular basis Congress wishes to invoke for that offense. This greatly simplifies and
shortens the substantive offense sections. The arrangement was, however, misconstrued by inattentive readers, who supposed that section 201 was a consolidation of all possible jurisdictional
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tional base as the gist of an offense. S. 1 followed the Commission Code in
declaring that "culpability is not required with respect to any fact which is
solely a basis for federal jurisdiction. '8 That is, a defendant's guilt of a substantive federal offense does not require proof that he knew he was on federal territory or that he was "affecting" interstate commerce. Artificial multiplication of charges is eliminated by declaring that "[tihe existence of multiple
jurisdictional bases for an offense does not increase the number of offenses
committed.

2s

Despite a huge pseudo-controversy, another area of general substantive
agreement was the so-called "piggyback jurisdiction." The issue relates to violations of federal laws, for example, civil rights, safety of interstate transportation, or robbery of national banks, where the core transgression against federal interests is accompanied by death or other personal aggression cognizable
under state law. While such killings, kidnappings and similar offenses might
have been left to separate prosecution by the state, the practical answer was to
have every aspect of the controversy disposed of in a single federal prosecution. That answer is incorporated in present federal law, albeit awkwardly,
by prescribing specially severe sentences for certain violations if a killing
occurs.8 3 All pending proposals adopt this approach with insubstantial variations.81

bases to be available for federal prosecution of any offense. Others may well have been shocked
simply to discover the breadth of federal potential, disinclined to give a prominence to the
phenomenon or to provide Congress with an easy format for enlarging the federal role if it so
desired.
These anti-federalist fears were sought to be assuaged in S. I by dismantling the catalogue.
This required spelling out in each substantive section the various federal bases applicable to that
section. Although the operative effect is quite close to the Commission's jurisdictional arrangements, the drafting becomes unhappily turgid. See, e.g., S. I § 1731(c) (thirty jurisdictional bases
for theft).
Paradoxically, the one section of the Commission Code that would have strongly reaffirmed
state responsibility for local offenses disappeared in S. 1. Commission Code section 207 called
upon federal law enforcement agencies to abstain from exercising a technically available jurisdictional power where the offense had no substantial out-of-state or federal dimension. Rather than
retaining this provision the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee adopted a different approach:
[S. 1] provides for submission by the Attorney General of annual reports to Congress,
setting forth for each offense the number of prosecutions commenced during the preceding year, and identifying the number prosecuted under each particular circumstance
giving rise to Federal jurisdiction. This is designed to provide the Congress with information that will flag any material increase or decrease in Federal prosecution in particular areas, thereby permitting inquiry to be made into the reasons for such increase or
decrease and prompting periodic evaluation of the proper scope of Federal jurisdiction
in such areas.
2 SUBCOMMITTE REPORT 33. Growing familiarity of the legal profession with the true import of
the Commission's jurisdictional arrangement may permit a return to the simpler formulation in
subsequent bills and a revival of Commission Code section 207.
81. COMMISSION CODE §§ 204, 302(3)(c); S. 1 § 202(d)(2).
82. COMMISSION CODE § 205; cf S. 1 § 201(b)(1)l.
83. See note 32 supra.
84. The discussions concerning "piggyback" jurisdiction were briefly summarized in the Sen-
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Modernized Definition of Offenses

A second major front on which S. 1 marches forward in the track of the
Commission Code, although with some stumbling, is bringing the definition
and grading of offenses into accord with twentieth-century conditions and
values. A new comprehensive "theft" section will replace the crazy patchwork
of existing sections dealing with many versions of acquisitive offenses such as
larceny, embezzlement, fraudulent conversion and obtaining by false pretenses.8 5 The opportunities for crooks to slip through the technical holes in
the present net will be narrowed. Penalties will be graduated according to the
scale of the thievery.8 6 The same grading principle will govern the penalization of tax fraud. 87 High corporate officials will be responsible for corporate
crimes if they contribute to the offense by willful or reckless default in a duty
to supervise corporate behavior. 88 Fine levels will be systematically graded,
and, for offenses involving pecuniary gain, may go as high as twice the
amount of the gain or twice the loss caused to the victim. 8 9 In order to touch
the sensitivity of major corporations to adverse public and political reactions,
corporate misbehavior will be discouraged by requiring the organization to
publicize convictions.9" Convicted corporate officers may be disqualified from
"
These
exercising management functions similar to those they had abused.
ate Judiciary Subcommittee Report:
[T]he concept has the advantages of permitting a unitary adjudication and punishment
of a defendant's entire course of criminal behavior, when a series of offenses is committed in the course of a Federal crime. However. indiscriminate application of this jurisdictional notion could also drastically impinge upon the traditional prerogatives of the
States by permitting Federal prosecution for offenses where there exists only a tenuous
Federal nexus at best.
2 SUBCOMMITIE. REPORT 30. See also id. 29-32; Note. Piggyback jurisdiction in the Proposed Federal
Criminal Code, 81 YALE L.J. 1209 (1972).
85. See COMxxISSION CODE §§ 1731-1735. 1741; S. I §§ 1731-1738. See also CoM.isSsiON FINAL
REPORT 205 (introductory note on theft and related offenses); 3 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 649-703.
86. COMMISSIOx CODE § 1735; S. 1 § 1731(b).
87. COMxISSION CODE § 1401(2); S. 1 § 1401(b).
88. CotMIrSSONx CODE § 403(4); S. I § 403(c).
89. COMMISSION CODE § 3301 ; S. I § 2201.
90. CoMI assION CODE § 3007; S. 1 § 2004. Under these sections the corporation or organization that has been found guilty of an offense may be ordered by the court to give notice of the
conviction to the class of persons or to the sector of the public affected by the conviction or
financially interested in the subject matter of the offense by mail, by advertising in designated

areas or through designated media or by other appropriate means. It is interesting to note that
while conservative members of the Commission favored a narrower publicity sanction, compare
COMMISSION ConE § 3007, with STUDY DRAFT § 405(1)(a), S. I adopted the broader version. The

use of unfavorable publicity as a sanction against corporate depredations is an idea whose time
has come. See Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of Jan. 4, 1975, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 57b(b) (Supp. 1976) (public notification respecting rule violation or unfair or deceptive act or
practice). See generally COMMISSION WORKINGS PAPERS 166, 191-93.
COMMISSION CODE § 3502; S. 1 § 1-4A3(b), 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (McClellan draft),
91.
reprinted in SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS, Part V, at 4248 (1973). In S. I §§ 2103(b)(6); and 3834(c),

this disqualification of corporate officers appears in modified form as a permissible condition of
probation or parole, respectively.
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advances in control of white-collar and high corporate crime are alone
enough to expose the absurdity of charges from the Left that S. 1 was a
fascist conspiracy between the "Nixon men" and Senator McClellan to enslave
the American people.92
Interestingly, S. 1 actually made some advances over the Brown Commission in the civil rights area, where the Commission was cautiously content to
codify existing law. The civil rights offenses are broadened to protect aliens as
well as citizens. 93 Infringement of civil rights is made an offense when perpetrated by an individual, and not merely, as at present, when perpetrated by
several persons in conspiracy . 4 Provisions against sexual discrimination have
been added to the civil rights sections.95 The offenses of rape and cognate
so as to eliminate pejorative
aggressive homosexuality have been consolidated
96
intercourse.
sexual
references to "deviate"
Among other modernizations in the definition and grading of offenses
that can be characterized as noncontroversial in view of the substantial concurrence of S. 1 with the Commission Code are the following: The distinctions between first and second degree murder, based on "deliberation" and
"premeditation," which centuries of experience have shown to operate
haphazardly and even perversely, will disappear,9 7 as will arbitrary limits on
the types of provocation that suffice to reduce a homicide to the level of
manslaughter.9" The new federal code will be shorn of antiquated and unenforceable morals legislation like the provision penalizing seduction of female
passengers on steamboats, regardless of age or consent, by "solicitation or the
100
making of gifts or presents." 99 In place of the present federal rape statute,
which authorizes life imprisonment or death without discriminating between
forcible ravishment by a stranger and intercourse between "dating" couples
who may have been engaging in sexual intimacies just short of intercourse,
the new federal code will reserve extreme penalties for the former situation. 0 1 It will also treat violent imposition of homosexual relations in a

92. See text accompanying notes 225-28 infra.
93. Compare S. 1 § 1501, with COMMISSION CODE § 1501 ("person" substituted for "citizen,"
which the Brown Commission accepted from existing law, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 1970)). See also
2 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 465-70.
94. 2 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 465-70.
95. S. I § 1504. See 2 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 482.

96.

Compare S. 1 §§ 1641 (rape), 1642 (sexual assault) and 1646 (general provisions), with COM-

MISSION CODE §§

1641 (rape), 1643 (aggravated involuntary sodomy),

1642 (gross sexual im-

position) and 1644 (involuntary sodomy).
97. COMMISSION CODE § 1601; S. 1 § 1601.
98. COMMISSION CODE § 1602; cf S. I §§ 1601(b)(1), 1602 (provocation broadened to include
anything that excusably leads to extreme emotional disturbance).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 219 (1970).
100. Id. § 2031.
101. COMMISSION CODE § 1641 (two classes of rape); cf. S. I § 1641 (rape is Class C Felony
punishable by up to fifteen years imprisonment; however, defendant will face additional liability
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manner parallel to the rape of a female by a male.'0 2 The federal government
will withdraw from its Victorian pretension to police the private sexual behavior of adults; the purview of the Mann Act' 03 will be limited to substantial
04
commercial operations. 1

C.

Sentencing

Sentencing is a third major reform front on which S. 1 advanced in the
direction marked out by the Brown Commission. It did not advance far
enough. It was also marred by retention of a retributive emphasis found in
existing law. Thus, sentencing remains a central controversy between proponents and opponents of S. 1, as will be shown below. 1°5 Nevertheless, it is
important to recognize the areas of agreement. To the extent that such consensus has been achieved, new domains of civil liberties have been staked out.
The most important sectors of this new domain are:
1.

Grading

Each serious offense will be divided into several degrees, reserving the
most severe penalties for aggravated forms of the offense.
2.

Specially dangerous offenders

The maximum sentence for each grade will be available only if the defendant is a dangerous recidivist, a professional criminal or a mental deviate, or
if he employs firearms or bombs in carrying out the offense. 06
3.

Consecutive or cumulated sentences

Harsh and arbitrary cumulation of sentences will be minimized not only in
the case of multiple mail fraud charges, 10 7 but also where multiple distinct
offenses are involved. 0 8 In principle, repetition of offenses is to be treated as
an aggravating factor within the statutory maximum for the grade, as provided in paragraph 2 above. No longer will a burglar who is implicated in five
or ten burglaries be theoretically subject to five or ten times the fifteen-year
for battery, kidnapping or other code offenses). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (Prop. Official Draft, 1962); 2 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 592-95.
102. COMMISSION CODE §§ 1643. 1644; S. 1 § 1645 (unlawful sexual contact is an offense two
grades below that of the corresponding offense under the rape sections).
103. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (1970).
104. COMMISSION CODE § 1841 (promoting prostitution); S. I § 1843 (conducting a prostitution business).
105. See Part III C. infra.
106. Compare COMMISSION CODE § 3202, with S. I § 3202(b).
107. See notes 72-74 supra and accompanying text.
108. If multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant at the same time or if a
term is imposed on a defendant who is already subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment,
the terms will run concurrently unless the court orders that they be served consecutively. Compare
COMMISSION CODE § 3204, with S. I § 2304.
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maximum for burglary.' 09 Instead, based on the severe nature and circumstances of the offense and the character of the defendant, he becomes one of
the minority of burglars who can be given a sentence as high as fifteen
years. 10 This but reflects the obvious truth that legislatures set fifteen-year
maxima precisely for the worst offenders.
The existing rule permitting cumulation of sentences has a number of
baneful effects. It permits gross inequalities in sentencing, since some judges
abuse the discretion to cumulate while most follow the practice of making
multiple sentences concurrent. Unlimited cumulative sentencing is also employed by a minority of judges to frustrate the legislative will with regard to
parole. A judge who is unsympathetic to parole generally or in the particular
case can give a sentence so long that the convict will not become eligible for
parole until he has fully served the maximum jail sentence that was appropriate for the offense. The judge thus succeeds in equating the minimum
with the maximum, imposing, in effect, a flat sentence, whereas Congress has
declared that the minimum for parole eligibility shall not exceed one third of
the maximum.'11
4.

Penal policy; legislative criteriafor sentencing; review of sentence

For the first time in the history of the country federal law will declare
the purposes of the penal system," I 2 provide guidelines for the exercise of
sentencing discretion,1 13 and direct the appellate courts to review at least
the longer sentences as a check against abuse of discretion by sentencing
judges." 4 In each case there are shortcomings in the S. 1 provisions, but that
should not obscure the central fact that progress beyond existing law was embodied in the bill.
5.

Parole

The new federal code will by common consent eliminate the absurdity of
present law which in effect prescribes the shortest period of parole supervi-

109. See 18 U.S.C. § 2111 (1970).
110. Under COMMISSION CODE § 1711(2), burglary is a Class B felony, the maximum term for
which is fifteen years, Id. § 3201(1)(b)1. Under S. I § 171 1(b) burglary is a Class C felony punishable by up to fifteen years imprisonment, id. § 2301(b)(3), unless the offender is deemed dangerous, in which case the maximum term is increased to twenty-five years. Id. § 2301(c).
111. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4202, 4208 (1970).
112. See COMMISSION CODE § 102 (derived from ILL. ANN. STAT. CH. 38, §§ 1-2 (SMITH-HURD
1972)), N.Y. PENAL LAW § 21 (McKinney 1970)); S. 1 § 101.
113. See COMMISSION CODE § 3101; S. 1, § 2102(a). See also COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS
1267-69, 1300, 1306-07.
114. Compare COMMISSION CODE Comment, at 317 (proposed revision of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 for
appellate review of sentences), with S. I §§ 3721-3726. As for requiring judges to provide written
justifications for sentencing actions, see COMMISSION CODE §§ 3201(3) (fixing a minimum term),
3202(4) (imposing specially long terms for dangerous offenders) and 3204(5) (exercising the limited discretion to make sentences consecutive). S. I does not require these written justifications.
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sion for the most dangerous convicts. This paradox results from the traditional view that parole is simply an act of mercy that permits service of part of
the sentence outside the prison walls. 5 A parole board is likely to keep the
most dangerous prisoners inside the walls until they have fully served their
sentence. In that event, no part of the sentence remains to be served under
parole supervision. In contrast, the most promising prisoners will be released
early and will have long years of unexpired sentence to serve on parole. S. 1
follows the Brown Commission lead in abolishing this irrational correction
program, providing instead that all prisoners serving substantial sentences
shall eventually be released under parole for periods roughly proportionate to
the period of actual confinement. t 6
In speaking of "consensus reforms" in this section of the article, I may be
overstating the matter. One sector of the community appears to have rejected
reform: the organized federal judiciary. Speaking in the name of the judicial
Conference of the United States, Chief Justice Burger addressed a letter to
Congress opting in favor of "existing laws," on the ground that having to
adapt their jury charges to new laws would be an "enormous burden" on
federal judges.' 1 7 That this institutional and personal concern of judges

115. Under current law a term of parole extends from release until the expiration of the
maximum term specified in the original sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1970). Contra, 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b) (1970) (special, longer parole terms apply for narcotics offenses that extend beyond the
term of imprisonment). See also 2 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 1047.
116. Compare COMMISSION CODE §§ 3201(2), 3403(2)(e), with S. 1, §§ 2303, 3834. There are
radical differences between the two approaches to the problem. The Commission envisioned the
parole period as falling inside the maximum sentence legislatively authorized. S. 1 makes parole
an addition to the legislatively prescribed term or any shorter term imposed by the sentencing
judge, and permits the Parole Commission to set the duration of parole within specified statutory
limits. S. 1 § 3834. This makes it difficult to compare the general level of severity of the two
codes, because the legislative maxima do not reflect differences in maximum period of confinement. The Commission's maxima must be reduced by the period of mandatory parole, whereas
an S. I sentence may have to be served out in prison, to be followed by as much as five years of
parole, which of course carries a contingent threat of further imprisonment for behavior that is
not necessarily criminal but merely violative of the conditions of parole.
Substantial liberalization of S. l's original parole provisions was incorporated in the January 15,
1975 version. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1975 1077-78 (Comm. Print 1976) (draft committee report
accompanying the revised bill).
117. Letter from Chief Justice Warren Burger to Congress (May 12. 1976). The letter reads
as follows:

By direction of the Judicial Conference of the United States I transmit to you herewith
a report unanimously approved by the Judicial Conference at its session on April 7,
1976, concerning H.R. 10850 and related bills pertaining to the proposed new Federal
Criminal Code. This report deserves careful study by your committee.
Permit me to call attention again to the searching discussion at the earlier Conference
meeting in which the essence of the Conference view was that the enactment of this
Code, as distinguished from a less complex recodification of existing laws, will impose an
enormous burden on all federal courts for a long period in the future. Just how long, no
one can safely predict. This will arise from the need to restructure jury instructions for
every new definition of criminal acts, in order to comport with the new Code, and from
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should be treated by them as the paramount consideration, blocking not only
current reform efforts but also any future pervasive or systematic reform, is
astonishing and disturbing. Perhaps, however, the Burger letter has been
misunderstood. The Judicial Conference of April, 1973, accepted the notably
favorable report of its Committee on the Administration of the Criminal
Law" and subsequently transmitted it to Congress. The Conference also
"[a]pproved in principle the proposal for a new or amended Federal Criminal
Code,"" 9 and directed the Committee to continue its close study of particular
provisions. The continuing labors of the Committee were noted in reports of
subsequent proceedings of the Conference.'
Although Committee reports
had referred to the task of revising jury instructions, it was only in the Report
of the Judicial Conference of September, 1975, that this consideration suddenly assumed major significance. In a paragraph preceding the usual Conference note of the Committee's on-going studies, the Judicial Conference declared that its "views ... as previously reported, reflected opposition to the [S.
1] legislation."'12' This statement is somewhat ambiguous in light of the fact
the appellate review of elements of those instructions by each of the Courts of Appeals
and ultimately by this Court.
I feel obliged also to call attention again to the unanitnous resolution of the Conference of Metropolitan Chief Judges opposing the enactment of the proposed new Code.
Its members are the 23 Chief Judges of the larger federal districts which together are
responsible for more than one-half of all cases in the federal courts.
See Denniston, Did Burger Letter Help Kill Criminal Code Reform Bill?. Washington Star, July 27,
1976, at A-2, col. 1.
118. We express general approval of the objectives sotight and methods utilized in the
reform of the federal criminal laws by all three approaches [i.e., Brown Commission, S.
1, and a Department of Justice draft introduced as S. 1400]. The President and distinguished members of Congress have commended the Brown Commission for its inagnificent endeavors. The work of the Commission demonstrated not only keen insight and
scholarship, but represented an effort to comply with the spirit of criminal law reform
begun by the American Law Institute in 1952 and completed ten years later with the
publication of the "Proposed Official Draft" of the Model Penal Code.
Report of the Committee on the Administration of the Criminal Law of the Judicial Conference
of the United States (April 5, 1973).
119. JUDICIAt CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATFS, REPORT OF PROCEFDINGS 15 (April 5-6,
1973).
120. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RFPORT OF PROCEEDINGs 78-79 (Sept.
13-14, 1973): JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 22 (March
7-8, 1974); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGs 56-57 (Sept.
25-26, 1975); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RFPORT OF PROCEEDINGtS 12 (April 7,
1976).
121. The paragraph, derived from the Report of the Committee on the Administration of the
Criminal Law read as follows:
The views expressed on S. 1, as previously reported, reflected opposition to this legislation on the ground that it contemplates unnecessarily sweeping redefinition of all federal crimes and will require, among other things, (a) that every district judge will be
required to restructure and formulate new jury instructions to replace those which have
evolved on a literal "trial and error" basis for well over 100 years; (b) that new instructions for newly defined crimes must then literally "run the gauntlet" of courts of appeals; and (c) that ultimately the Supreme Court will be obliged to review numerous
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that no explicit opposition appears in earlier Judicial Conference reports 2'
nor in the Judicial Conference Report of April 7, 1976, where the federal
criminal code and the work of the Committee are discussed.' 23 One can only
hope that improvement in the law has not been rejected by the federal judges
on the ground that they are too busy. Certainly state experience with recently
enacted comprehensive codes offers no support for the view that judges will
be intolerably burdened during the period of transition from the archaic to
the modern. 124
III
HUBRIS AND REPRESSION ON THE RIGHT

Federal penal reform foundered in the Ninety-fourth Congress despite
consensus on many major advances. This temporary check was due to the
determination of conservatives to have their bill carry numerous "hard-line"
features that the Brown Commission had rejected, and demagogic opposition
from the' Left, directed not only against the repressive features of S. 1 but
against S. 1 in its entirety.
The first destructive element of the hubris of the Right was overambition.
Instead of restricting S. 1 to a substantive criminal law plus technical amendments necessary to fit the project into the United States Code, the Senate
Subcommittee chose to recapitulate, with modifications, the entire range of
the criminal justice system. Thus, S. 1 has sections on investigative and law
cases to pass finally on the adequacy of the instructions required by the new code. In the
present state of overcrowded dockets at every level, the new and complex burdens that
S. 1 will impose on the federal courts are incalculable. The Conference nevertheless
continues to comply with congressional requests for comments on specific parts of S. 1.
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 56 (Sept. 25-26 (1975)).

One does not know which "views . . . previously reported" are referred to, nor what is meant by
"reflected opposition" as distinguished from "reflected concern" or "directly opposed."
122. The only indication that there was a divergence of viewpoints on S. 1 can be seen in the
Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States for March 6-7, 1975.
Acting on the report of the Committee on the Administration of the Criminal Law and analyzing
various provisions of S. 1, the Conference made the following statement:
In discussing S. I members of the Conference again expressed great concern that if
this legislation is enacted, new forms of jury instructions will be required and appellate
courts will be called upon to review the correctness of new instructions and that all of
these factors will have a serious impact on the work of all federal courts.
Members of the Conference continued to express the view that a traditional recodification of the existing statutes would serve all the purposes of a completely new code redefining federal crimes. Some expressed the view that if such a comprehensive code is to
replace all present federal criminal statutes, the present time was most inappropriate in
view of the rising caseloads, new classes of litigation and the adjustment necessary to
meet the Speedy Trial Act over the next five years.
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 19-20 (March 6-7, 1975).
123. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 12 (April 7,
1976).
124. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
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enforcement authority generally,
extradition,

1 28

venue,

'2 9

counsel

25

wire-tapping

'2 6

and witness immunity,'

for the indigent,'

30

l3

bail,' '

27

treatment of

juveniles and the insane, 132 pre-trial procedure,1 33 rules of evidence,' 34 forfeiture proceedings,' 31 the internal operations of the Parole Commission," 36 and
the establishment of a new Victim Compensation Fund.' 37 Most of this was
unobjectionable and some was even progressive, but the bill was distended to
become an intimidating document of over 750 pages. 1 38 Given the provocative
character of the Subcommittee's proposed innovations relating to substantive
law, opponents could be forgiven for viewing with suspicion these extra hundreds of dense pages represented as largely restatements of existing law, but
never having been reviewed by the Brown Commission. In short, the
opposition's target had been broadened and rendered more vulnerable.
The major departures from the Commission Code proposed in S. 1, while
disastrous from the point of view of liberal democratic policy, were perhaps
most objectionable because they gravely impaired the chances of getting any
reform at all enacted. While disagreement as to capital punishment and gun
control could hardly be avoided, a review of conservative insistence on other
issues such as censorship and the defense of insanity serves to illustrate the
excess of zeal that has so endangered the reform program.
A.

The "Official Secrets" Provisions

Recollection of the Pentagon Papers case and continuing paranoia in the
White House about "leaks" to the news media led to the inclusion in S. 1
of the notorious provision making unauthorized disclosure of "classified information" a felony. 3 9 Even after being watered down from earlier ver125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

S. I §§ 3001-3018.
Id.§§ 3101-3109.
Id. §§ 3111-3115.
Id.§§ 3211-3217.
Id.§§ 3311-3313.
Id.§§ 3401-3405.
Id.§ 3501.
Id.§ 3601.
Id. §§ 3701-3702.
Id.§§ 3711-3715.
Id. §§ 40014005.
Id. §§ 3831-3837.

137. Id. §§41114115.
138. The facts that approximately 500 pages of the bill consisted of conforming amendments
raising no separate substantive issues, and that tax bills, as well as other complex legislation, are
often of comparable length did not moderate the opposition's exploitation of the awesome size of
S. 1. See notes 296, 299 infra and accompanying text. See also conclusion infa.

139. S. 1 § 1124. The section provided that:
A person is guilty of an offense, if, being or having been in authorized possession or
control of classified information, or having obtained such information as a result of his

being or having been a federal public servant, he knowingly communicates such information to a person who is not authorized to receive it.
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sions,1 40 the proposal for an "Official Secrets Act," as it came to be called in the
press, was horrendous. Classified information was defined as any information
"marked or designated" pursuant to a statute or regulation as "requiring a
specific degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of
national security. '' 14' Thousands of underlings in the civil and military establishments would thus be authorized to impose restraints on the right of the
public to know what the government was doing, and this at a time when the
country was moving in the opposite direction by enacting "sunshine laws"
to assure public access to information about bureaucratic decisionmaking
processes.' 4 2 That the information "was not lawfully subject to classification"
was declared to be no defense. 143 But the Subcommittee sought to mollify
critics with putative safeguards against prosecution for disclosing "classified
information" which should never have been classified or which should long
since have been declassified. Prosecution was to be barred unless a government agency had been established to review classification.1 44 The head of that
agency, the head of the classifying agency, and the Attorney General would
all have to certify prior to the return of an indictment that the information
45
had been lawfully classified.
A final striking bit of overreaching was the explicit penalizing of "unauthorized disclosure" even to members of Congress; only a "lawful demand" (a
subpoena?) from a "regularly constituted" congressional committee was acceptable as an "affirmative defense," i.e., with the burden of proof on the
defendant. 46 The spectacle of criminal prosecution of an honest and patrioId. § 1124(a). Both present law and the Commission Code, of course, contain provisions punishing the betrayal of certain narrowlv defined classes of secrets such as diplomatic or military codes,
18 U.S.C. § 798 (1970), nuclear iechnology, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2274, 2298(b) (1970), and basic defense
plans and weaponry, 50 U.S.C. § 784 (1970). See COMMISSION CODE § 1114.
140. The Subcommittee yielded to some public and senatorial criticism by adding a provision
to section 1124 excepting from its purview the recipients of unlawfully disclosed classified material. 2 SUBCOMMITrEE REPORT 244-45;see S. 1 § 1124(b).
141. S. I § 1128(b).
142. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (Supp. 1976).
143. S. I § 1 124(e). However, a defense was accorded where a defendant "had attempted to
obtain the declassification of the information and had exhausted all administrative remedies
....
Id. § 1124(d)(2), (e). Even such a mythically persistent dissident bureaucrat would have no
defense of illegality if anyone, for example. a news reporter, gave him 'an ything of value" (legal
expenses?) in return for disclosure. Id. § I124(d)(2)(B). Moreover, assuming all other hurdles
were overcome, the accused still had the burden of proving that the classification was indeed
unlawful, thus reversing the presumption of innocence with regard to the central issue of culpability.
144. Id. § I 124(c). The Subcommittee thought that the Interagency Classification Review
Committee, an existing agency established by Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. § 339 (1974),
satisfied this requirement. See 2 SUBCO.iMrrTE. REPORT 246.
145. S. 1 § 1124(c)(2).
146. Id. § 1124(d)(1). It should be noted that this narrow exemption derives from existing
law, 18 U.S.C. § 798(c) (1970), and from section 1114(4) of the Commission Code. Both of those
sections, however, deal with narrow categories of "classified" information, with respect to which
narrow exemptions might be considered appropriate.
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tic civil servant who had revealed shenanigans in defense contracting to a
Congressman was alone sufficient to generate and justify the revulsion that
greeted section 1124. Unfortunately, that revulsion was easily extended to S. 1
generally, as the news media of the United States turned this into the central
issue in the legislation.
A barbed bait was thrown to the press in the form of a provision that the
receiver of an unauthorized disclosure could not be prosecuted as an accomplice of the discloser or for conspiracy with or solicitation of the principal
offender.' 47 But the Subcommittee Report made it clear that prosecution of
newsmen for illegal receipt of "national defense information," whether classified or not, would be possible under proposed section 1 123(a)(2)(b) which
required a person in unauthorized possession of national defense information
to "deliver it promptly to a federal public servant who is entitled to receive
48
it."
The American press (lid not take the bait. Both the press and the public perceived that first amendment values were being subverted not only by
direct threats to newsmen but also by efforts to choke off sources within the
bureaucracy. Many Americans believe that "leaks" from the bureaucracy are a
bastion of popular control of government and, therefore, of democracy and
liberty. Suspicion of the "Official Secrets Act" was further intensified by
common knowledge that intentional leaks relating to vital elements of international policy and security are a common feature of "news management" by
the highest executive officers.
S. l's incursions on freedom of speech were not confined to section 1124.
The), were found also in the treatment of espionage, sedition and conspiracy,
''149
theft of information, obscenity, and "impairing a government function.
B.

Abolishing the Insanity Defense

Repeal of the insanity defense in S. 1 is another example of jeopardizing
progress by encumbering the bill with impolitic and provocative features. Insanity was recognized as a defense only if the mental defect caused a lack of
"the state of mind required as an element of the offense charged.' 15 ' This
means, for example, that a defendant who cut his wife's throat would be acquitted if he was so crazy as to believe that he was merely slicing cheese, for
then he would not have had the intent to kill required for murder. But if he
insanely supposed that his wife was poisoning him, or that God required him
to dispose of his wife, he would be convicted. Present law, approved not only
147.
148.

Id.

§ I124(b). See note 140supra.
S. I § 1123(a)(2)(b)l. See 2 SUBCOMMITTEE

REPORT 244-45. Although this offense is a

carryover from existing law rather than an innovation by S. 1.see id., the cover of the ACLU
pamphlet STOP S-I carried the statement: "Did you read the Pentagon Papers in your newspaper? S. I could put the paper's editors in jail." ACLU, STOP S-1 I (undated pamphlet).
149.

[he subject is elaborated on in Schwartz, supra note 4, at 3203.

150. S. I § 522.
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by the Brown Commission151 but also by the American Law Institute"5 2 and
all of the federal courts of appeal, 153 acquits the defendant (with appropriate
provision for civil constraint) if he "lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform to the requirements of law.""5 4 To
fail to accord such a defense to a defendant is to ignore the relevance to guilt
of moral responsibility and power to choose. It is to use the gravest sanctions
of the system of deterrence we call the criminal law against people who are
undeterrable. In effect, S. 1 abolished the defense of insanity, since lack of
the required criminal intent would be a defense under the Code whether or
not the defendant was insane. Thus S. 1 treated the sane and the insane alike.
This radical departure from fundamental notions of culpability in crimefollows two decades of intense consideration of the subject by the courts
and commissions, resulting in a remarkable unanimity among legislators
and courts in favor of the Commission's position. 155
It is far from clear that the formula proposed in S. 1 would even accomplish the proponents' purpose to exclude a perplexing issue from trial by
jury, to limit the role of psychiatrists, and to increase the number of murder
convictions. 156 This is so because section 522 left untouched the requirement
of proving criminal intent, and it recognized that mental illness may negate
criminal intent. Psychiatrists, then, would assuredly be found to give expert
opinions that homicidal intent was precluded by the defendant's insanity. Opposing experts would be marshalled. Juries would continue to be bombarded
with confounding testimony. The only difference would be that judges would
instruct on impairment of intent rather than impairment of the defendant's
ability to conform to the law. Juries would continue to convict or acquit in
response to inarticulate feelings of justice. It is true that many of the foregoing unsatisfactory features are also found in trials of the insanity issue under
present law, but if they cannot be eliminated, and are instead only aggravated
by the S. 1 proposal, there is surely no justification for a radical innovation
that calls for disregarding issues of culpability.
C.

Harsh Sentencing

Sentencing is the core of a criminal code, and it is here that the contrasts
between S. 1 and the Commission Code were most pervasive and significant.
Ironically, this aspect of the reform, directly concerned with deprivation of
§

503.

151.

COMMISSION CODE

152.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Prop. Official Draft,
See I COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS 230-34.
COMMISSION CODE § 503.

153.
154.
155.

1962).

The proposed abolition had some academic, bar association, and psychiatric support, see
2 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 112-13, and had indeed been favored by the Brown Commission's consultant in this area. I COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS 247-54.
156. See 2 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 109-11.
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liberty and overbroad official discretion, received the least attention from civil
liberties organizations and the press. Perhaps this is due to the fact that sentencing issues are not concentrated in a single highly visible provision, and
can be appreciated only by analyzing sections dealing with maximum and
minimum terms, probation, parole, consecutive sentences, special sentences
for dangerous offenders, and appellate review of sentence.
The sentences prescribed in S. 1 for particular offenses were not always
higher than those recommended by the Brown Commission. 15 7 Looking at a
single provision, one might conclude that S. 1 was sometimes more lenient
than the Commission Code, as when S. 1 provided for parole eligibility after
the prisoner had served one-quarter of his term, 1 8 whereas the Commission
contemplated service of one-third of the imposed prison term.' 59 But these
appearances were deceiving, as the following discussion will show.
1.

Excessive maximum terms

The key to comparison of the maximum terms provided in S. 1 and the
Commission Code is to remember that the maxima prescribed in S. 1 were
supplemented by extended terms for specially dangerous offenders 1 60 and by
parole terms of as much as five years."' In contrast, the maxima set forth in
the Commission Code include a portion reserved only for specially dangerous
offenders 62 as well as a "mandatory parole" term, that is, the terminal portion of the sentence that is to be served outside prison (absent parole violation). 163 An example will help to clarify the difference between these two
sentencing schemes.
Perjury was a Class D felony under S. 1' and a Class C felony under the
Commission Code. 16 Each of these categories entailed a stated maximum of
seven years. 66 To the seven-year maximum under S. 1 there would have to
be added the possibility of a seven-year extended sentence for recidivists, professional criminals or other specially dangerous types, 167 and a parole term
which might be as much as five years. 16 8 The S. 1 maximum, therefore, would
be nineteen years if calculated on the same basis as sentences under the

157. Compare S. I §§ 1641, 2301(b)(3) (fifteen years for rape), with
3201(1)(a) (thirty years).

158.
159.
160.

S. 1 § 2301(d).

161.

Id. § 3834(b).

§ 3201(3).
S. 1 §§ 2301(c), 2302(b).
COMMISSION CODE

162.

COMMISSION CODE

163.

Id. § 3201(2).

§ 3202.

164. S. 1 § 1341(b).
165. COMMISSION CODE § 1351(1).
166. S. 1 § 2301(b)(4); COMMISSION
167. S. I § 2301(c).
168. Id. 2303(a), 3834(b).

CODE

§ 3201(1)(c).

COMMISSION CODE §§

1641,
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Commission Code. A specially dangerous perjurer convicted under the Commission Code, on the other hand, would be subject to a maximum total
sentence-including extended sentence and parole--of seven years.1 6 9
Additional differences can be identified by examining the parole provisions under the two codes. A perjurer convicted under the Commission Code
and sentenced to the seven-year maximum could be released by the Parole
Board after serving one year,17 0 should be released as soon as the Board belives that no purpose is served by continued confinement,7 l and must be released on parole after serving four years and eight months. 7 2 On the other
hand, the perjurer convicted under S. 1 and sentenced to the fourteen-year
maximum prison term might have to serve a minimum term in prison of
three and one-half years.'7 3 While the Parole Commission would have to consider the parole of the prisoner at the end of such maximum term (or after
each year of imprisonment if no term of parole ineligibility were set), 174 it
would not be required to release him until he had served out all fourteen
years. 175
The simplest way to ameliorate the harsh S. 1 maxima would be to provide that the parole component of the sentence be deducted from those maxima rather than added to them. Similarly, the extended term for specially
dangerous offenders should not be added to the stated maximum, but rather
should be conceived as a portion of the ordinary maximum reserved for the
exceptionally dangerous, as under the Commission Code.1 76 The adoption of
169. If the convicted perjurer were not a specially dangerous offender, the maximum sentence he could be given under the Commission Code would be five years. COMMISSION CODE
§ 3202(1). The comparable maximum under S. I would be twelve years-a seven-year maximum
prison term and a five-year maximum term of parole, S. I §§ 2301(b)(4), 3834(b).
170. COMMISSION CODE § 3402(1).
171. The Commission Code provided that, after the first year of imprisonment, a prisoner
sentenced to more than three years in prison
shall be released on parole, unless the [Parole] Board is of the opinion that his release
should be deferred because:
(a) there is undue risk that he will not conform to reasonable conditions of parole;
(b) his release at the time would unduly depreciate the seriousness of his crime or
undermine respect for law;
(c) his release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional discipline; or
(d) his continued correctional treatment, medical care or vocational or other training
in the institution will substantially enhance his capacity to lead a law-abiding life if he is
released at a later date.
Id. § 3402(1). It should be noted that a sentencing judge could set a minimum prison term in
certain circumstances. Id. § 3201(3).
172. COMMISSION CODE § 3402(3). The section provides in part that: "The parole component
of [a] maximum term shall be . . . one-third for terms of nine years or less .
I..."
ld. § 3201(2).
173. "The authorized terms of imprisonment for felonies that may be required to be served
prior to eligibility for parole are not more than one-fourth the term authorized .....
S. I
§ 2301(d).
174. Id. §§ 3831(b), (d).
175. Id. §3831(c).
176. COMMISSION CODE § 3202(1). See note 169 supra.
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the same principle in S. 1 would tame the ferocity of S. l's maxima, and
would comport with the obvious congressional intent expressed in existing
maxima, namely that they go much higher than is appropriate for the ordinary offender.
2.

Probationdiscretion

S. 1 directed the sentencing judge to consider a fairly conventional list of
factors relevant to the grant or denial of probation, but, unlike the Commission Code, emphasized those factors pointing towards the "need" for imprisonment for retributive or deterrent purposes. 177 Notably, S. 1 failed to state
that prison should be resorted to only if the judge were satisfied that it was
the more appropriate disposition. Such a preference for probation had been
espoused by the Brown Commission, 1 78 the American Law Institute

79

and the

American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal justice.18 0 The
omission of a stated preference in S. 1 meant that no judge would have to
face up to this crucial issue, and that different judges would operate on different assumptions as to where the "burden of proof" lay on the issue of
imprisonment versus probation. The failure to declare legislative policy on
this point was aggravated by excluding from appellate review the refusal of a
18
judge to grant probation, except where he imposed a long prison sentence. '
The probation provisions of S. 1 were defective in two other important
respects. In contrast to the Commission Code, which contained no exclusions
from eligibility for probation,18 2 S. 1 excluded from probation all Class A
offenders,' s a criminals who used guns,' 8 4 and drug offenders. 8 5 The main

177.

S. I § 2101(a) directs the sentencing judge to consider:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of
the defendant; and
(2) the need for the sentence imposed:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care,
or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.
178. COMMISSION CODE § 3101(2):
The court shall not impose a sentence of imprisonment upon a person unless, having
regard to the nature of the circumstances of the offense and to the history and character
of the defendant, it is satisfied that imprisonment is the most appropriate sentence for
the protection of the public ....
179. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 (Prop. Official Draft, 1962).
180.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION

PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

RELATING TO PROBATION § 1.3 (Approved

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

S. 1 § 3725(a)(I)(B).
COMMISSION CODE

S. 1 § 2101(a).
Id. § 1823(b).
Id. § 181 1(b).

§ 3101(1).

Draft, 1970).

STANDARDS
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effect of these provisions would be to vest discretion as to probation, ordinarily a judicial function, in the prosecutor, who would make the effective decision regarding eligibility for probation when he selected the specific charges
to bring and the plea bargains to accept.
3.

Consecutive sentencing

The Brown Commission's provisions on consecutive sentences embodied
three important principles: (1) consecutive sentences were flatly precluded in
certain instances;" 6 (2) even where permitted, there would be a low ceiling on
the aggregate of consecutive sentences; 1" 7 and (3) the use of consecutive sentences was in any event confined to cases where "exceptional features" required such action "for reasons which the court shall set forth in detail."' 8
The corresponding provisions of S. 1 did not deal adequately with any of
these principles. A conspiracy sentence could be added to a sentence for the
target substantive offense. 1 9 A sentence for possessing a gun during the
commission of a crime not only could but had to be made consecutive, 190 even
though the crime itself carried a high maximum penalty, as in the case of
robbery, because it commonly involved use of weapons.
4.

Parole discretion

Under section 3831(c) of S. 1, the Parole Commission would be required
to make five difficult findings before parole "may" be granted: that release
would not be inconsistent with 'just punishment"; that it "would not undermine the affording of adequate deterrence"; that there would be no "undue
risk" of further criminality; that it would not adversely affect institutional discipline; and that further "correctional treatment" would not improve the
prisoner's "capacity to lead a law-abiding life." 19 ' These criteria would serve to
extend the periods of actual confinement toward the very long limits provided in S. 1. They incorporate a tolerance for pointlessly detaining many in
prison because a few may be bad risks.
Where the Brown Commission took the position that release should be
186. Consecutive sentences could not be imposed for crimes whose prohibition protects the
same interest with varying degrees of specificity, crimes which are part of a single course of
conduct, or crimes which involve substantially the same criminal objective. COMMISSION CODE
§ 3204(2)(c).
187. Generally, the aggregate of consecutive sentences could not exceed the statutory maximum for an offense of the next level above any offense covered by the sentence. Id. § 3204(3).
So also, consecutive sentences were barred where one offense was "included" in the other,
id. § 3204(2)(a), or was only an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit the other. Id.
§ 3204(2)(b).
188. Id. § 3204(5).
189. This conclusion is reached by noting the absence of any limitation on such a sentence in
the section on multiple sentences. See S. 1 § 2304.

190. Id. § 1823(b).
191.

S. 1 § 3831(c).
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favored unless, in the opinion of the Parole Board, some public purpose
would be served by detention, S. 1 barred parole unless a series of negatives
were proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Even if such proof were
made, there was no direction from Congress to grant parole; the Parole
Commission was simply told that it might then release. Proof of a negative is
notoriously difficult; proof of these negatives verges on the impossible, for
they involve such issues as what constitutes "just punishment" or "adequate
deterrence," as well as predictions of future behavior.
Accordingly, the parole provisions of S. 1 presented one of the central
issues in reform of the federal criminal law, since they bore on length of
confinement, on the degree to which Congress would prescribe guidance for
one of the most important yet least reviewable administrative decisions in
government, and on the fundamental principle that detention is not to be
imposed or prolonged unless someone is satisfied that it serves a purpose. In
contrast, under S. 1, detention would be prolonged until someone was satisfied that it served no purpose. The fundamental principle of equal justice was
violated by the formula that parole "may" be granted but need not be, even
when the difficult proof requirements are met, so that prisoner A stays in jail
while indistinguishable prisoner B goes free."' 2 It is noteworthy that the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976 mandates parole (1) when
release would not 'jeopardize the public welfare," "depreciate the seriousness"
of the offense, or "promote disrespect for the law," and (2) after service of
two-thirds of sentences upwards of five years unless the Parole Commission
determines that the prisoner has seriously and frequently violated institution

rules or that there is a "reasonable probability" that he will re-engage in
crime. 193
5.

Appellate review of sentence

Under section 3725 of S. 1 a defendant could have his sentence reviewed
only in felony cases where the sentence imposed exceeded one-fifth of the
192. The Criminal Justice Section of the American Bar Association favored a "presumption
for probation," but declined to follow the Brown Commission on the desirability in parole proceedings of a similar preference for release unless the Parole Board believed that continued
imprisonment served some public purpose. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CRIIINAL JUSTICE SECTION, POLICY REGARDING S. I-THE PROPOSED FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE App. A, at 19, 24 (1975)

(report to the House of Delegates). The report misstated the issue in referring to a "presumption
...that all prisoners, no matter how long their sentences, should be paroled at the completion of
the first six months." Id. at 24. There is no such presumption. On the contrary, given the criteria
including 'just punishment," a rational parole board could hardly release serious offenders early
in the parole period. The Brown formulation simply recommends that parole thinking be
oriented not towards detention unless there is ground for release (the "mercy"-.e., retributive
-approach) but to release unless detention serves some purpose, even a retributive one. Moreover, under the Commission Code as well as S. 1, the parole board's decision against parole is
not reviewable except on procedural or constitutional grounds, COMMISSION CODE § 3406, thus
emphasizing the precatory character of the parole guidance provisions.
193. Pub. L. No. 94-233, § 4206(a), (d), 90 Stat. 223.
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authorized maximum. 4 This would deny review of misdemeanor sentences,
although they might involve several years of imprisonment (in the case of
multiple misdemeanors), while permitting review of felony sentences involving
fines only. It would also deny appeal from prison sentences as long as six
years where the authorized maximum was thirty years. If a cut-off is necessary, it ought to be such as to allow review of any sentence beyond six months
or a year. In addition, a defendant should be allowed review of a decision
denying probation even if he is not allowed to challenge the length of his
sentence. The difference between probation and no probation, that is, the
decision whether or not the defendant goes to jail at all, is clearly more important than the precise length of sentence. Because of that importance, S. 1
proposed to allow the prosecution to appeal any decision in favor of probation.' 95 A corresponding appeal by the defense of a denial of probation would
seem only fair.
S. 1 was overly generous to the government by permitting it to seek review
of a sentence whenever a trial judge put a defendant on probation and
whenever he set a prison term below three-fifths of S. l's high maxima.' 96
This generosity is especially dangerous in view of the authority which S. 1
conferred upon the appellate court to increase a sentence under review upon
petition of the government. '9 Thus, threats by prosecutors to seek review
and increase of sentence could be employed to discourage defendants from
seeking review.
6.

Miscellaneous

The foregoing criticisms call for extensive revision of S. l's sentencing
provisions. In the course of that revision, other improvements should be
sought. It would be helpful to incorporate section 2301(a), the general section
on sentencing, into a declaration of congressional policy that sentences (both
legislative maxima and terms actually imposed) should be related to specified
goals. For example, a sentence motivated solely or predominantly by deterrence should normally be quite short; a goal of incapacitation' suggests a
longer confinement, which may incidentally reflect also some element of "just
punishment."' 9 .
The concept that terms should be related to the goals of sentencing,
whether articulated in section 2301 or elsewhere, would furnish a rationale
for deciding how many classes of offenses to set up in the Code. Section 2301
194.
195.

S. I § 3725(a).
Id. § 3725(a)(2)(B).

196. Id. § 3725(a)(2).
197. Id. § 3725(d)(2)(B).
198. Compare Senator Kennedy's proposal for a federal sentencing commission to promulgate guidelines for trial judges. S. 2699, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). This bill was co-sponsored
b% Senators McClellan and Hruska.
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of S. 1 provided nine classes, not counting a tenth provided in effect by the
division of Class A felonies into capital and non-capital categories. There simply are not that many different useful categories of criminality for sentencing
purposes. The Brown Commission proposed six categories, or only five if one
sets apart "infractions," a category of offenses for which only fines could be
imposed. 199 Increasing the number of categories is chiefly a reflection of the
retributive impulse; the legislator desires an array of finely graduated classes
of crime to which he can assign particular offenses in accordance with his
intuitive assessment of the relative seriousness of the offense. The logical end
of this process is the chaos of existing law, under which Congress has established one hundred or more categories of offenses punishable by distinct sentence maxima, 20 0 although concededly most of this present differentiation
among offenses is the result of inadvertence and irrational fluctuations of
retributive temper in the successive congresses that enacted particular criminal laws. The pressure on the draftsman to create intermediate retributive
categories is particularly strong when, as the staff proposed to the Commission, the maximum short-term sentence for a misdemeanor (imposed for
purely deterrent purposes) should be three or six months while the maximum
for the lowest felony grade might be in the neighborhood of four years. In
vain did we argue that intermediate maxima like one year or two years were
gratuitously severe from a deterrent point of view and would usually be inadequate from the point of view of incapacitation or rehabilitation. The
Commission itself adopted a one-year maximum for misdemeanors, 0' and S.
1 intercalated a low-grade felony carrying a three-year maximum.202

Short-term imprisonment precludes any rehabilitation program, and there
is no basis for believing that there is a significant deterrence differential between thirty days, six months or one year. Accordingly, misdemeanor penalties should be sharply restricted except for "persistent misdemeanants. "203 S. 1
departed notably from the Commission Code by authorizing imprisonment
for "infractions.204

D.

Wiretapping

On two issues, wiretapping and entrapment, S. I was not significantly
worse than existing law,2 0 5 but the positions taken, needlessly in the case of
199. CoMmlssiO', CODE § 3002.
200.

See STUDY DRAFr xxxii-xxxiii.

201. COMMISSION CODE § 3201(1)(d). The Study Draft presented a choice of a one year, six
month or three month maximum for misdemeanors. STUDY DRAFT § 3204(a).
202. S. 1 § 2301(b)(5). S. 1 also departed from the Commission Code by authorizing up to five
days imprisonment for "infractions." Compare S. I § 2301(b)(9), with COMMISSION CODE § 3001(3).
203. See COMMISSION CODE § 3003 (defining a "persistent misdemeanant" as a person who is
convicted three times within five years for Class A misdemeanors or more serious crimes).
204. Compare S. I § 2301(b)(9), with COMMISSION CODE § 3001(3).
205.

S. I §§ 3101-3109 substantially reenacted the arrangements for eavesdropping by federal
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wiretapping, were calculated to arouse the sharpest opposition. Wiretapping
falls into the category of procedure and evidence, which the Brown Commission did not undertake to revise.2 0 6 The Commission Code simply penalized
illegal wiretapping without addressing the question of the conditions under
which wiretapping should be legal. 20 7 S. 1, on the other hand, incorporated
("reaffirms," opponents said) provisions of existing law detested by the liberal
community. In addition, the Subcommittee Report added expansive glosses
relating to warrantless eavesdropping in "emergencies, '' 20 8 to eavesdropping
on persons not named in the warrants but involved in the same suspected
criminality 0 " and to the need for merely "substantial compliance" with fed210
eral requirements to validate wiretapping by state police.
The original miscalculation regarding the desirable scope of reform legislation led also to the "reaffirmation" in S. 1 of other extremely controversial
recent statutes. Thus section 3713 purported to render confessions admissible
notwithstanding violation of the Miranda rules on interrogation of uncounseled suspects held in police custody; and section 3714 purported to render
eyewitness testimony admissible regardless of improper pretrial police influence upon the witness to make a desired identification. That these sections
were wholly or partially unconstitutional2"' could only intensify the outrage
felt by opponents of such needless "reaffirmation" of congressional assaults
on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Bill of Rights.
E.

Entrapment

Under existing law, entrapment is handled as a substantive defense, that
is, raising a question regarding the defendant's criminal intent. 212 The Brown
Commission therefore could not finesse the issue by categorizing it as one
falling outside the range of its proposed reform of substantive penal law. The
basic question was whether the law should tolerate the conviction of defendants for committing crimes which they were induced to commit by improper
and state officials, sometimes with and sometimes without a warrant, which were introduced into
federal law by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510,
2515-2519 (1970).
206. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
207. CoxMMIssIoN CODE § 1561(2)(a).
208. 3 SUBCOMMITFEE REPORT 94546.
209. Id. at 943.
210. Id. at 942.
211. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring police to inform suspects in
custody of their constitutional rights prior to interrogation); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967) (accused has right to have counsel present at post-indictment lineup); Gilbert v. California,
388 U.S. 263 (1967) (testimony that witnesses had identified defendant at illegal line-up is inadmissable). But cf United States %'.Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) (no right to counsel at post-indictment
photographic display); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (no right to counsel at pre-indictment show-up).
212. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); Sherman %.United States, 356 U.S. 369
(1958); Sorrells v.United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
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pressure from police agents. Section 551 of S. 1, following existing law, permitted such convictions. The culprit might have acted "solely as a result of
active inducement" by a law enforcement officer, but the prosecution would
nevertheless succeed if the culprit had been "predisposed" to commit the
offense.2 13 The Commission took the predisposition issue out of the case and
concentrated instead on the propriety of the police behavior. The police
would be free, under the Commission proposals, to set up an "opportunity to
commit an offense," for example, to offer to buy narcotics from a suspected
seller. They would be forbidden only to use "means likely to cause normally
law-abiding persons to commit the offense,"2' 1 4 but that prohibition would
apply without regard to the character or predisposition of the target.
The Commission's position commends itself on the following grounds.
First, it gives clear guidelines to the police as to what society will tolerate in
the way of police inducement. It does not say, as does S. 1: "You may go so
far sometimes and much farther at other times (if the suspect is 'predisposed')," at the risk that a jury will later find that the suspect was not sufficiently predisposed. Second, it avoids the perversion of criminal trials into
inquisitions regarding the accused's predisposition as manifested by his alleged participation in prior offenses not involved in the present charge. It is
inconsistent with the whole tradition of Anglo-American law to try a man for
his character, or to make conviction or acquittal of two defendants, both of
whom have engaged in the same conduct with the same criminal intent, dependent on their alleged criminal proclivities. Third, dealing with entrapment
as a bar to prosecution on account of police impropriety rather than as an
element of the defendant's guilt is consistent with the handling of other similar problems in criminal law, for example, the exclusion of coerced confessions and illegally obtained evidence, where the government is barred from
exploiting its own lawlessness regardless of the defendant's guilt. Fourth,
treating entrapment as a bar lightens the burden of proof for the prosecution, which will not then have to negate entrapment "beyond a reasonable
doubt."
F.

Public Safety Orders; Riots

The Commission sought to narrow the scope of the ancient "riot" offense,
which permitted mass arrests without discriminating among leaders, followers
and mere bystanders. 2 15 At the same time the Commission wished to take
realistic account of the difficulty police have under riot conditions in distinguishing between participants and bystanders, and of the need on occasion to
require that even the rights of bystanders give way. For this purpose the
213.
214.
215.

S. I § 551.
COMMISSION CODE

See id. § 1801.

§ 702(2).
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Commission proposed that superior police officials, in controlling riots and
promoting public safety, might issue reasonable orders to move, disperse, or
refrain from specified activities in the immediate vicinity of the riot. Violations of such orders were to be "infractions" only, that is, noncriminal finable
offenses like traffic violations. 21 6 Under S. 1, the public safety order could be
given by any policeman or other public servant without authorization by
higher authority, and violation of this minimal riot control measure could
result in a five day jail sentence.

217

G.

Miscellaneous

This catalogue of repressive features of S. 1 may conclude with a reference to the significant alteration S. 1 made in the Brown Commission's statement of Purposes of the Code.2 1 1 In the first place, S. I dropped the
Commission's declared purpose "to safeguard conduct that is without guilt
from condemnation as criminal. '21 That declaration was the closest that
either bill came to adopting the principle of "strict construction" of penal
laws; both bills call for construction "in accordance with the fair import of
their terms to effectuate the general purpose" of the Code. 22 0 The more conventional canon of strict construction is a relic of the ages when the common
law (i.e., judicial power to define crime) was sacrosanct and legislation was
regarded as a suspect intrusion. In a modern setting, strict construction leads
to absurd judicial results, to obstruction of clear legislative purpose and to
extraordinary, self-defeating complexity of drafting as legislators seek to anticipate every potential "strict construction." Nevertheless, there is an important value to be preserved in having legislation drafted and interpreted with a
sensitivity to the tendency of every generalized prohibition to imperil behavior
that is neutral or even desirable. That was the teaching of the "purpose"
which S. 1 deleted.
Second, S. 1 unmistakably emphasized retribution as the purpose to be
given priority in the interpretation and administration of the Code. Where
the Commission spoke of insuring public safety, 2 ' S. 1 spoke of assuring just

216. Id. § 1804. An additional desirable safeguard, proposed in SIUDY DRAFT § 1804, would
have excluded police orders directed to news reporters, television cameramen and the like, to
discourage the not infrequent efforts of riot control forces to operate free of public surveillance.
When the Study Draft was being considered by the Commission, I favored a broader explicit
exclusion of elective and other officials who might be interested in first-hand observation of the
riot and control measures. The conservative wing of the Brown Commission persuaded the
Commission to drop these additional safeguards.
217. S. I §§ 1862, 2301(b)(9).
218. COMMISSION CODE § 102.
219. Id. § 102(d).
220. S. I § 112(a); cf CoMrMIssIoN CODE § 102, Comment (integrates rule of construction with
Statement of Purposes).
221. COMMISSION Conr § 102(a).
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punishment. 22 2 Some might think that these subtle shifts of emphasis have
little practical import, especially in a context that lists all the usual (and inherently contradictory) goals of the criminal justice system: deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation and, in the Commission Code as well as in S. 1, "merited
punishment." But we are dealing here with the first attempt to articulate by
federal legislation the complex goals of the criminal justice system. To list the
purposes, however contradictory and however equivocal in aggregate effect, is
to make sure that no consideration is overlooked-legislators, judges and the
public are thereby educated, and counsel have a statutory text to invoke. But
it is something of a disaster to go further, pushing the priority of a "just
desserts" philosophy and deprecating the ancient wisdom that a penal law
must not so zealously pursue the wicked as to endanger the innocent.
IV
FLATULENCE ON THE LEFT: THE RHETORIC OF OPPOSITION

The provocation from the Right was great. The response from the Left
was demagogic, deceptive and probably counterproductive in the struggle to
promote liberty and justice. A mighty stench was generated to "STOP S. 1."223
The campaign did not discriminate between good provisions of S. 1 and the
very bad provisions, nor between the bad provisions introduced by S. 1 and the
rest which merely retained existing law. On the contrary, the Left insisted that
the bill was so infused with fascism as to be unamendable. Most disappointing
was the failure of the Left to recognize that reform of the criminal law was
itself a civil liberties project that should enlist their fervent support. Americans for Democratic Action, a leading left-of-center group, did see the point,
and combined its strong opposition to S. 1 with a powerful affirmative statement on the need for reform. 224 The habituation of most other civil liberties
groups to being against perceived encroachments on freedom prevented them
in this instance from recognizing the affirmative civil rights need for criminal
law reform. They failed to comprehend that positive legislation was essential
in the field of criminal law as it was in the field dealt with in the Civil Rights
Acts of 1964 and 1968.225 The Left mounted no campaign for criminal law
222. S. I § 101(b)(l).
223. The chief movers in the STOP S. I campaign were the American Civil Liberties Union.
the National Committee Against Repressive Legislation and the National Lawyers Guild.
224. The ADA position was as follows:
Versions of the federal criminal code developed by the McClellan subcommittee of the
Senate Judiciary Committee (S. 1) and the Department of Justice (S. 1400) are repressive
and regressive.
ADA calls for the support of a new federal criminal code along the lines proposed by
the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws headed by former Governor Pat Brown of California. Specifically, we:
1. oppose capital punishment and life sentences without the possibility of parole;
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reform. There came from the civil rights establishment only an occasional
grudging "We do not oppose revision of the Federal Criminal Code" combined with a blanket condemnation of S. 1 as "inherently unamendable. '226
Alexander Hamilton, writing in The Federalist about the opponents of the
constitutional proposal for an independent judiciary, referred to "the rage for
'
objection which disorders their imaginations and judgments."2 27
He might
have said the same of the intemperate rhetoric of the Left when it excoriated
S. I as a plot by Nixon and his Watergate gang to enslave the nation, to
provide defenses for themselves in pending prosecutions, and to facilitate future usurpations by the Executive Branch. The fact that John Dean, who had
participated in the White House "cover-up," had several years before been a
member of the Brown Commission staff was put forward by some as an explanation for the Commission Code provisions on mistake of law and performance of public duty, which arguably would exculpate the Watergate offenders. This argument ignored the fact that Dean had had nothing to do with
the drafting of these sections, which indeed merely followed Model Penal
2. oppose mandatory minimum sentences which preclude judicial adaptation of sentence to individual cases, and invade the function of parole boards;
3. oppose the tendency to government censorship involved in regressive obscenity
legislation and suggestions that executive classification of information should be backed
by criminal sanctions;
4. oppose the abolition of the defense of insanity as envisioned in S. 1400;
5. oppose imprisonment for possession and use of marijuana;
6. oppose indiscriminate incorporation of state and local penal law (often antiquated
and medievally harsh) for federal enclaves;
7. insist upon effective national control of the private possession of handguns;
8. insist upon legislative formulation of standards for parole and probation, with a
presumption in favor of liberty unless the judge or parole board believes that the goals
of punishment are better served by imprisonment;
9. favor more local responsibility through a declaration in the federal code against
federalizing trivial local offenses, especially in areas like gambling, prostitution, petty
frauds. The mere fact that the federal mails or a telephone call are peripherally involved
should not lead to federal involvement;
10. favor systemized grading of "regulatory offenses"-4.e., violations of administrative
rules involving no evil intent or substantial harm, and no manifest risk to the interests of
others-and elimination of imprisonment as a sanction for a first offense of this type.
AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION, 1974 ADA NATIONAL POLICY 107.
225. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1970); Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 73
(codified in scattered sections of 18, 25, 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
226. Countryman & Emerson, What Constitutional Authorities Think of the Bill!, in National
Committee Against Repressive Legislation, Dangerous S.B. I (brochure published by opponents
of S. 1). Professors Countryman and Emerson went on to declare that "[t]he objective of the
draftsmen was to incorporate in the criminal code every restriction upon individual liberties,
every method and device, that the Nixon Administration thought necessary or useful in pursuit
of its fearful and corrupt policies." Id. This astonishing statement disregards not only the numerous consensus libertarian reforms listed earlier, see notes 49-116 supra and accompanying text,
but also such aspects of S. 1 as its harsh dealing with perjury and obstruction of justice, see notes
164-75 supra and accompanying text, two offenses at the heart of the White House conspiracy,
and the several advances made by S. I in conventional civil liberties areas. See notes 93-96 supra
and accompanying text.
227. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 483 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (A. Hamilton).
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Code recommendations of the American Law Institute published a decade
before the plots in the Nixon White House. If one wished to make a plausible
connection between Dean's work at the Brown Commission and the debacle at
the White House, it might better have been this: Dean did work on portions
of the Code having to do with perjury and obstruction of justice; that work
could well have sensitized him to the danger of criminal prosecution for the
cover-up, and so figured in his decision, first, to warn his Chief and then to
"blow the whistle," that is, disengage himself from the conspiracy and cooper2 28

ate with the prosecutors.

A.

Mistake of Law; Superior Orders; the "Ehrlichman Defense"

The main targets of the "STOP S. I" campaign, apart from the censorship
issues discussed above 22 9 and obviously calling for strenuous resistance, were
the defenses which supposedly would exculpate perpetrators of official crimes
of the Watergate type, 230 and provisions that would supposedly authorize
23
suppression of protests such as the anti-Vietnam War demonstrations. 1
The controversy over the so-called Ehrlichman defense 23 2 illustrates the
worst features of the "STOP S. 1" campaign. As will be shown below, the S. I
proposal was misinterpreted. Even as misinterpreted, it erred, if at all, on the
side of civil liberty, not against it. 2 3 3 Moreover, even if the provision could
indeed be construed to exculpate the architects of the Watergate cover-up,
that loophole could be closed by a single clarifying amendment. Instead, the
228. An interesting sidelight on Dean and the canard that he was a White House tool for
distorting the reform of the Code is provided by his work on the capital punishment controversy.
Dean's employment at the Brown Commission had been sponsored by the conservative members,
and like them he favored capital punishment. When it came time to address this issue, I decided
to restrict staff submission to a survey of preceding research and literature because it was clear
that any advocacy by me would be attributed to my known abolitionist convictions and would
persuade no one on the other side. I asked Dean, a known proponent of capital punishment, to
do the survey. After spending six weeks on the project he informed me that, as a result of his
reading, he had changed his mind. See 2 CoNiNIsso,," WORKINC PAPERS 1347. His conservative
sponsors were quite unhappy. Later, when Watergate broke, I found myself being interviewed by
press and broadcast media about my former employee. Some of the interviewers insisted on
interpreting these events as showing that Dean was "unprincipled"! Some might prefer the interpretation that Dean was intelligent, open-minded and responsive to evidence.
229. See text accompanying notes 13949 supra.
230. From the cover of ACLU's pamphlet, STOP S-1: "Did you think the President's men
could claim the, were just following orders? S. I could get them out of jail." ACLU, supra note
148, at 1.
231. From the cover of the ACLU pamphlet, STOP S-1: "Did you Protest the Vietnam War?
S. I could put you in jail." ACLU, supra note 148, at 1.
232. See United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Former presidential
advisor John Ehrlichman asserted that his order to break into the offices of a psychiatrist (lid not
constitute taking part in a conspiracy to violate the victim's civil rights because he was acting
under an inexplicit mandate from the President.
233, Interestingly, the provisions originated not with the diabolical Senate Judiciary Subcommittee or the White House, as paranoid elements of the Left would have had it, but with the
liberal drafters of the Model Penal Code and the Brown Commission Code.
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Left chose to hold the entire penal reform proposal hostage to a dubious
interpretation of a peripheral provision. Finally, it may be noted that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, speaking largely through Chief Judge
Bazelon-whose civil libertarian badge is as shiny as anyone's-has recently
vindicated the policy position challenged by ACLU and NCARL. Precisely in
the cases of Ehrlichman and the "footsoldiers" who obstructed justice or burglarized on orders from the White House, the court sustained convictions
against high officials despite their incredible claims of good faith reliance on
superiors,2 34 but drew the line against treating as criminals underlings who act
in good faith reasonably believing that they are executing official duties law235
fully defined for them by seemingly responsible superiors.
The S. I sections in question are section 541 (exercise of public authority),
section 521 (mistake of law or fact) and section 552 (official misstatement of
law). The corresponding sections of the Commission Code are section 602
(execution of public duty), section 304 (ignorance or mistake negating culpability) and section 609 (mistake of law). In general, these sections provide
that activities which would be criminal for laymen are not criminal for officials lawfully carrying out their public duties. The public executioner is not a
murderer. The policeman taking a lawfully arrested suspect to the stationhouse is not a kidnapper. These propositions are not controverted by anyone.
Indeed, they are truisms or tautologies: lawful action is not crime. Nevertheless, a code that purports to be comprehensive is incomplete if it contains
unqualified condemnations of homicide and abduction without explicitly recognizing that there may be occasions when such behavior is justified. Controversy arises only in the case of a person who acts on mistaken belief that he
is so justified. Under what circumstances should that belief be accepted as an
excuse? In modern law, excuse for reasonable mistake is quite broadly accepted, as in the case of mistakes of fact in the exercise of the privileges of
self-defense, defense of habitation or prevention of violent felonies. The excuse is an application of the general civil liberties principle that culpability
ought to be proved before the state may be allowed to punish,
Two refinements of the general rule of exculpation for reasonable mistake
must be considered in the present context. These relate to mistakes of law
and to actions taken while carrying out orders given by a superior. Mistaken
belief as to the coverage of the penal law itself is not an accepted excuse
unless the reasonableness of the mistake rests on some objective foundation
such as authoritative judicial interpretation or official pronouncement by re-

234. United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
235. United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The "footsoldiers" also won a
$200,000 settlement from the trustees of the Committee to Reelect the President in a lawsuit
based on their having been duped into committing illegal acts by false representations that the
government had sanctioned these acts. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1977, at 1,col. 1.
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sponsible law enforcement agencies.23 6 This limitation of excuse is seen as
necessary to prevent factitious defenses, perhaps based on the advice of corrupt or ignorant lawyers. 237 On the other hand, mistake of law will sometimes
excuse even if the belief is unreasonable, where the special kind of culpability
238
required by the definition of an offense is negated by the mistake.
The "superior orders" defense supplements the mistake of law defense. It
functions as a kind of presumption in certain hierarchial organizations, for
example, the army, that a person authorized by society to issue drastically
enforceable commands knows what he is doing, knows whether or not his
command is lawful, and is entitled to obedience. Conversely, the subordinate,
upon whom society has laid a powerful duty of obedience, is not ordinarily
deemed culpable if he allows his duty to obey to outweigh doubts as to the
legality of the command; he is liable only if he knows the command is unlawful.23 9 The defense is not couched in terms of mistake of law, reasonable or unreasonable, because in the typical situation in which it is intended to
operate, no legal opinion is being proffered or received. Accordingly, the
privilege to obey need not be circumscribed, like the mistake of law defense,
by requirements that the command emanate from a high and responsible
source or be in writing.
Against this background we may appraise the opposing positions in the
controversy over the "Ehrlichman defense." What emerges is that the Left
took a strikingly anti-civil liberties position. Trapped by its own volleys of
rhetoric against S. I as a McClellan-Nixon conspiracy, and responding only to
yesterday's headlines rather than to the lessons of history, it rushed into a
"law-and-order" position to the right of Senator McClellan on mistake of law:

subordinate public servants and ordinary citizens acting at the request of even
high officials were to be convicted of crimes without regard to their good
S. I § 552; CoMMISSION CODE § 609.
237. But see Long v. State, 44 Del. 262, 65 A.2d 489 (1949) (defense in a bigamy prosecution
that accused reasonably believed, relying on counsel's opinion, that a foreign divorce from his
first wife was legally valid).
238. See S. I § 521; CoMMslIssIoN Cony § 304. See, e.g., Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959) (no
contempt of court in defying order to testify in reliance on honest belief, based on attorney's
advice, that respondent enjoyed the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination): Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (no deprivation of' federally secured civil rights without specific
awareness that behavior is "that which the statute forbids"); People v. Shaunding, 268 Mich.
218, 255 N.W. 770 (1934) (no larceny in the taking of goods of which one believes himself the
owner, though he is mistaken as to controlling law); People v. Weiss, 276 N.Y. 384, 12 N.E.2d
514 (1938) (no kidnapping if one supposes himself to be acting in authorized collaboration with
law enforcement agencies). For excellent surveys of the precedents on mistake of law, see
COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS 135-41; 2 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 154-58.
239. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10 (Prop. Official Draft 1962) (military orders); of. COMMISSION CODE § 602(2) (person who responds to public servant's directive to use Iorce in assisting him
is exculpated unless the action directed is "plainly unlawful"). For a discussion of the desirability
of encouraging citizens to responad to apparently official calls for aid, see United States v. Barker,
546 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
236.
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faith belief that they were following society's lawful mandate like model or
even heroic citizens. The paradoxical anti-civil libertarian thrust of this reaction is strikingly demonstrated by the situations presented in Raley v. Ohio24 °
and Cox v. Louisiana.241 In Raley, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed
the contempt convictions of witnesses who had refused to testify before a state
investigating committee on the grounds of self-incrimination, after the committee had mistakenly advised the witnesses that the privilege was available to
them. The Court found this to be "an indefensible sort of entrapment. 2 42 In
Cox, convictions for attempting to obstruct justice by demonstrating "near" a
courthouse were reversed because of evidence that the chief of police on the
scene had opined that parading across the street from the courthouse was not
"near," although that unwritten "official" interpretation was subsequently held
erroneous. 243 The position advocated by the Left would unavoidably have led
to these convictions being upheld.
The civil liberties implications of a generous mistake of law/superior orders defense are even broader than indicated by the foregoing illustrations of
their relation to the right to claim constitutional privileges or to exercise freedom of speech and assembly. There are hundreds of thousands of public
servants whose duties involve arrest and search behavior ordinarily prohibited
by law: customs officers, revenue agents, building guards, policemen, firemen,
investigating officials and so on. The line between what is lawful for them to
do and what is unlawful is notoriously vague, yet they are under pressure
zealously to do all that is lawful in carrying out their responsibilities. Excesses
of zeal must be corrected, and in cases of gross and willful abuse of official
authority they must be prosecuted as crimes. But surely in a civilized society
the correction of nonculpable transgressions of vaguely defined authority
should not be accomplished by criminal prosecution where the servant acted
in good faith in obedience to seemingly lawful directions of high authorities.
It is the errant high authorities who are shown to be at fault, and such correction as is required for too-obedient subordinates should take the form of better training and of civil disciplinary measures such as suspension or discharge
from employment. The Supreme Court was plainly right in suggesting in
Raley that it would amount to entrapment for society to train and arm men
for law enforcement duties, place them in quasi-military subordination to
superiors, and then prosecute them for conforming to plausib'e commands.
Even if the mistake of law defense were narrowly defined for ordinary applications, it would have to be broadened for people placed in such circumstances. The ordinary citizen acts on his own initiative in complying or not

240.

360 U.S. 423 (1959).

241.

379 U.S. 559 (1965).
360 U.S. at 437-39, 443.
379 U.S. at 568-72.

242.
243.
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complying with the law. He is not placed in a crossfire between official demand that he act aggressively and official threat to punish him if the aggressive act, though conforming to a plausible particularization of society's demand through superior orders, is subsequently held to be unlawful.
There are ironies in the position taken by the Left on the Ehrlichman
defense apart from the spectacle of civil libertarians adopting a harsh lawand-order stance against selected targets. The targets were vulnerable without
distorting the law of justification, and the net result of a successful campaign
to discredit defenses has been to reinstate aspects of present law that should
be detestable to knowledgeable civil libertarians. Ehrlichman could not have
gotten off even if the law had left open the possibility of a good faith defense
under some circumstances. All that was needed to convict him were instructions to the jury that the good faith defense did not extend to "unreasonable"
reliance on others' legal opinions (especially when the actor was a lawyer or
legally sophisticated), that it did not extend to orders given outside the military context which did not purport to be legal opinions from an impartial
source, and that it most assuredly did not extend to orders or legal opinions
emanating from a fellow conspirator.2 44 In correspondence with the American
Civil Liberties Union I proffered a simple draft which would have explicitly
required such instructions. The suggestions proved unacceptable, however, to
groups already committed to the proposition that S. 1 was not amendable.
But of course S. 1 was amendable, and the Left eventually acknowledged
that by sponsoring H.R. 10850,45 its own amended version of S. 1. In that
bill, section 501 provided that the defenses specified "are not exclusive ....
Additional bars and defenses may be developed by the Courts of the U.S. in
the light of reason and experience. ' 246 This departure from the Commission
Code introduces a vast vagueness in the Code's impact. Quite plainly, for example, the public duty defense just discussed has not been "abolished" as the
draftsmen seem to have intended. The courts are left free to adopt whatever
rule they like. The open-ended invitation to judges to add to the listed defenses is a civil liberties monster. It was earlier urged on the Brown Commission by the Right in order to retain all sorts of bad things-for example, the
244. The Criminal Justice Section of the American Bar Association supported the position of
the Judiciary Subcommittee that the Ehrlichman defense was adequately precluded by requiring
the exculpating official opinion to be "public." AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SECTION, supra note 192, at 11. The proposal was inadequate in two respects. It did not afford a
defense based on superior orders rather than legal opinions, and it did not cover the situation of
orders or legal opinions necessarily given in private, as in the Barker case, but reasonably relied
on by subordinates. This portion of the Criminal Justice Section's report was rejected by the
House of Delegates on June 4, 1975. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SUMMARY OF ACTION TAKEN BY
THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES

34 (1975).

245. H.R. 10850, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The bill was subsequently revised and reintroduced as H.R. 12504, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
246. H.R. 10850, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 501 (1975). S. 1 contained a similar provisions, S. 1
§ 501, without the express invitation to the courts to develop additional defenses.
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right of police to kill in suppressing riots and the right of a householder to
shoot to kill a supposedly burglarious intruder whether or not he was perceived as a threat to life (as where the burglar is shot leaving the house). To
leave the judges free to define defenses is virtually to abandon the effort to
define crimes, since an offense is defined by the combination of what is prohibited and what is declared to be justified.
B.

Repression of Political Dissent

The Left's position on the potential of S. 1 for repression of political dissent was based on a number of provisions that reenacted, usually with some
amelioration, existing law. One cannot disagree with criticism directed at the
overreach of existing espionage, sedition, sabotage and riot law; the Brown
Commission proposed substantial cutbacks in these areas. But it is quixotic to
reject a multi-faceted reform code because one has not achieved all one's desires with respect to these rarely invoked laws.
The Left's objection was primarily directed against section 1302 of S. 1,
which made it a misdemeanor to "intentionally obstruct, impair, or pervert a
'
government function by means of physical interference or obstacle."2 47
The
ACLU objected that this statute

48

could be misused against lawful and peaceful demonstrations. Virtually every
mass demonstration would, at one moment or another, fall within [the] prohibition .... [I]t would be up to the prosecutor to determine whether a large
demonstration on federal grounds or near federal buildings was or was not
"physically interfering" with some government function. Even an influx of
cars carrying demonstrators to the chosen site might constitute the proscribed
felony. Since mass arrests on the basis of group behavior are constitutionally
forbidden by the particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment, the
statutes would lend themselves to selective abuse by law enforcement officials.
A response to these criticisms must begin by noting that section 1302 of S. 1
derived from section 2421 of the Model Penal Code and section 1301 of the
Brown Commission Code; 49 thus it was not a product of a Nixonite conspiracy. The section was designed to replace a variety of existing laws dealing
with obstructions of particular governmental operations such as "the due administration of justice, ' 250 the activities of law enforcement and correctional
officers, 251 United States marshals and other officials serving or executing

247. S. I § 1302(a).
248. ACLU, supra note 148, at 8.
249. A significant difference, however, is that S. I penalized physical obstruction even of
unlawful government activity if the official was acting "in good faith." See S. I § 1302(b).
250. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1970) ("endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede ... corruptly or by
threats of force").
251. Id. §§ 1502 (law enforcement officers), 2231-33 (correctional officers).

Page 1: Winter 1977]

FEDERAL REFORM

judicial process, 252 the mails, 253 grain inspection 114 and military recruiting. 255
The list is not exhaustive. Moreover, existing statutes are not always restricted
to physical obstruction; they are not always limited to intentional obstruction;
the penalties they prescribe vary irrationally; and they rarely articulate the
defense found in S. 1 that the governmental activities obstructed were un25 6
lawful.
It is hard to believe that the Left knowingly sought to legitimate obstruction of the mails or grain inspection, of judicial decrees against racial segregation of public schools or judicial decrees protecting blacks' right to vote. It is
hard to take seriously the notion that because prosecutors might abuse laws
against obstruction of government, we should have no such laws. It is as well
to say that we should repeal traffic laws or the trespass laws, which also can be
and have been abusively employed against peaceful demonstrators. Unfortunately the unabusable law has not yet been invented, and we must still rely on
the first and fourteenth amendments to guard against perverted applications
of otherwise useful legislation. The real beneficiaries of the repeal of laws
against the obstruction of government will be those who oppose federal marshalls enforcing the civil rights laws, those who impede the pursuit of drug
smugglers or terrorists, and those who would sabotage the fire fighting arrangements of a federal forest ranger.
C.

Disorderly Conduct and Assimilated Offenses

The Brown Commission, drawing on the Model Penal Code, drafted a
narrow and precise definition of disorderly conduct and made it punishable
by fine only. 257 Rigid ideology and legal ineptitude led the Left to reject that
solution. Responding only to the notorious potential for abuse in vaguely defined misdemeanors characterized as "disorderly conduct" or "vagrancy," the
Left proposed a section which failed to cover obvious public disorders such as
exploding stink bombs in public places, intentionally harassing passersby in
public places by persistent obscenities and intentionally rendering public
highways, subway platforms or train stations unusable by physical obstruction. 25 8 The Left envisioned a penal code without any provision against "inde252. Id. §§ 111, 1501.
253. 18 U.S.C. § 1701 (1970).
254. 7 U.S.C. § 87(b)(8) (1970).
255. 18 U.S.C. § 2388 (1970).
256. See 2 SUBCOMMIYEE REPORT 302.
257. COMMISSION CODE § 1861. The section does authorize up to thirty days imprisonment for
soliciting sexual contact while loitering in a public place. Id. §§ 1861(l)(f), 3201(l)(e).
258. H.R. 10850, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1861 (1975):
A person is guilty of [disorderly conduct] if, with intent to alarm, harass, or annoy
another person or in reckless disregard of the fact that another person is thereby
alarmed, harassed, or annoyed, he engages in violent, tumultuous, or threatening conduct.
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cent exposure. ' 259 These omissions were all the more imprudent because the
Left proposals also, quite inexplicably, omitted any provision for assimilating
for federal enclaves minor offenses defined in the law of adjoining states.2 60
As a result, federal forts, reservations and the like would be converted into
havens for misbehavior legitimately proscribed by the surrounding communities. Moreover, since no federal penal code will ever be enacted without
an assimilated crimes provision, the Left's rejection of decently circumscribed
federal definitions of disorderly conduct would mean that state law
definitions--often harsh and arbitrary-would replace federal law.
D.

Anti-Libertarian Proposals from the Left

The tunnel vision that sees legislation only from the point of view of potential abuse or of yesterday's Watergate headlines led the Left to make proposals of extraordinary severity and repressiveness. For example, the Left
proposed to penalize disobedience of a court order by a maximum of two
years imprisonment. 26 1 Only liberals with a short memory could thus undertake to subvert the Brown Commission's effort to restrict the tyranny of
punishment for judicial contempt. 26 2 Obviously the draftsman was reacting
angrily to recent disobedience of court orders in desegregation cases. He was
not thinking of disobedience of injunctions against strikes or picketing.
Similarly, the proposal to make it a felony for officials to "deceive the
public ' 263 is an astounding measure to be born among civil libertarians. Is it
really desired that, notwithstanding the first amendment, criminal courts become the forum for testing the validity of public pronouncements about defense needs and plans, crop prospects, food and drug research, inflation, unemployment and housing? Who but a General Stillwell or a Daniel Ellsberg
would be targets of such prosecutions? Are we so naive as to believe that the
FBI must always announce accurately its suspects and intentions in a proposed drive on organized crime or that public announcements on international
relations accurately reflect sympathies? Should civil libertarians leap to espouse criminal law solutions for problems much better handled by disciplining or dismissing faithless public employees, or just by public discussion?

259. There was no analog in H.R. 10850 to COMMISSION CODE § 1852, which limits the misdemeanor to situations where the indecent exposure would alarm or seriously offend the unwilling onlooker.
260. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
261. H.R. 10850, §§ 1335, 2301(a)(4).

262.

The Commission Code limits imprisonment for contempt to six months.

COMMISSION

CODE § 1341(2).

263. H.R. 10850, § 1346(a):
A non-elected public servant is guilty of an offense if he, with intent to deceive the

public, makes a false, fictitious or fraudulent and material oral or written statement or
representation about any matter within the jurisdiction . . .of a department or agency of
the United States.
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Compromise Rejected: Snatching Defeat from the Jaws of Victory

By August, 1975, under the influence of liberal Senators Hart of Michigan, Kennedy of Massachusetts and Abourezk of South Dakota, a considera264
In the spring of
ble amelioration of S. 1 had been accepted by the Right.
1976 a final push by the same group of senators was remarkably successful in
gaining new concessions sufficient to render S. 1 a proper vehicle for reform
of the federal criminal code. The "STOPS. 1" campaign had been so effective that it had become apparent to the Right that reform would founder
unless they compromised. Senator Hruska was to retire at the end of the
Ninety-fourth Congress, and Senator McClellan had only two more years to
the end of his last term. Both men viewed reform of the penal code as intrinsically important and as a fitting crown to their legislative careers. Pragmatic
politicians, they were prepared to give up on most of the provisions that stood
in the way of the Senate passing a reform bill. In addition, the Administration, through Attorney General Levi, issued a statement welcoming "accommodation."2 6 5 Concessions from the Right26 6 included the following:

(1) There was to be a "new bill"; the reform bill would no longer carry
the hated designation S. 1. Although this looks like a pure formality, it was
not. It was a politically significant symbolic act; the Right was striking its flag,
and the Left would be given its triumph without having to eat its hard words
about the unamendability of the McClellan bill.
(2) The "official secrets" provisions would be dropped. 6 7
268
(3) Sentencing maxima would be substantially lowered.
(4) Provision for capital punishment would be dropped, 269 deferring the
issue to separate disposition after the Supreme Court's decision of pending
cases challenging the constitutionality of that penalty and the procedures for
27 0
imposing it.
(5) Section 3714 relating to admissibility at trial of eyewitness identification notwithstanding improper pre-identification influences by the police
would be dropped. The analogous section 3713 relating to admissibility of
264. See S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), which was reported to the full Committee on
October 21, 1975. The bill was reprinted under date of April 1,1976, and was accompanied by a
draft Committee report bearing the same date. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
supra note 116.

265. Department of Justice, Press Release (April 6, 1976).
266. See Memorandum from Senators McClellan and Hruska to Senators Hart, Kennedy and
Abourezk (March 25, 1976). This memorandum was written in response to a compromise proposal circulated by Senators Hart, Kennedy and Abourezk on March 8, 1976, which was itself a
response to a Memorandum from Senators Mansfield and Scott to Senators McClellan, Hruska,
Hart and Kennedy dated February 9, 1976.
267. Id. at 34. See notes 139-49supra and accompanying text.
268. Memorandum, supra note 266, at 5. See notes 160-76 supra and accompanying text.
269. Memorandum, supra note 266, at 5;see S. I §§ 2401-2403.
270. The Supreme Court's decision in Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (1976), would seem to
sustain the constitutionality of the S. 1 proposals on capital punishment.
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"voluntary" confessions by uncounseled suspects in police custody would be
qualified by an introductory clause: "unless otherwise required by the Con271

stitution.11

(6) Substantial limitations were accepted on existing legislation (on the
272
books since the jittery days of 1917) dealing with wartime sabotage.
(7) Possession of "small amounts" (under 10 grams) of marijuana would
273
be decriminalized.
(8) The constitutional remnant, if any, of the Smith Act,27 4 directed
against the advocacy of violent overthrow of the government, was abandoned;
there would be no "reaffirmation" of this dubious bit of existing law. 275 This
concession was all the more remarkable in that it went beyond the Brown
Commission, which, out of political prudence, had contented itself with erecting safeguards against application of the Smith Act in contravention of the
276
first amendment.
(9) Defenses, other than the noncontroversial mistake of fact defense,
would be dropped from the bill, leaving them to judicial development on a
case-by-case basis. 277 For reasons previously stated, 278 this was a blow to the
integrity of the Code, but it represented substantial concession from the
Right. It meant, for example, abandoning the proposed repeal of the insanity
2 80
defense2 78 and the attempt to codify the law on entrapmentL
On the last two points, insanity and entrapment, of course, the Left could
hardly congratulate itself since the judge-made law to which the issues would
be remitted was no more favorable to their views than the proposed statutory
text. Down the legislative drain with these proposals went other less controversial justification provisions such as self-defense 28' and defense of property.2 8 2 In these bypassed areas lurked such long-standing, nasty problems as
whether or not an attacked person must take a safe retreat rather than kill his
assailant, whether taking life is ever justifiable in defense of property, and
whether policemen may, when it seems necessary, kill to effect arrests or prevent escapes. Regrettably, the Left, 28 3 the Right,28 4 the American Bar
271. Memorandum, supra note 266,
272. Id. at 3;seeS. I §§ 1101, 1112,
273. Memorandum, supra note 266,
a misdemeanor punishable by lip to 30
274. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1970).
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

at 6.
1114.
at 4; see S. I § 1813(c)(2), making possession of marijuana
days imprisonment. S. I § 2301(b)(8).

Memorandum, supra note 266, at 2.
See COMMISSION CODE § 1103. Comment.
Memorandum, supra note 266, at 2.
See text accompanying note 246 supra.
See notes 150-56 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 212-14 supra and accompanying text.
S. I § 542.
Id. § 543.
See H.R. 10850, § 501. See note 246 supra and accompanying text.
See S. I § 501 ("defenses to prosecution set forth in this chapter are not exclusive").
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Association28 5 and the Special Committee of the Judicial Conference of the
United States on the Administration of the Criminal Law 2 6 all agreed that
most of these issues were inappropriate for legislative resolution.
Rejected by Senators McClellan and Hruska were the following: (1) total
repeal of the federal obscenity laws; (2) abandonment of the interstate commerce jurisdiction over riots; and (3) deletion of mandatory prison sentences
for hard drug traffickers. 28 7 On the issue of wiretapping, where most of the
Left was demanding outright repeal, the liberal senators made politically
more realistic demands for restricting the practice with regard to offenses
covered, warrantless eavesdropping in "emergencies," "national security" taps
and the like. The conservative senators did not refuse negotiations on these
proposals.
But for the Left there was no need to await the outcome of such negotiations. An ACLU press release on April 8, 1976, declared: "The 'hard-line'
attitude of the two leading sponsors of this legislation lends little hope that S.
1 can be successfully overhauled during this session of Congress. The ACLU
must therefore reaffirm its commitment to oppose Senate Bill 1 in its present
form."288 That statement was relatively mild. It implicitly recognized the
amendability of S. 1 by expressing opposition to the bill only "in its present
form." The ACLU's then Washington executive director, Charles Morgan,
had previously gone much further in an article in the Washington Star, denouncing the actions in the Senate as "A 'Compromise' That Lynches the
Constitution."2 9 He took the position that no civil liberties issue could be
deferred, and that all reform must await congressional agreement with the
whole program of the ACLU, including repeal of wiretapping and obscenity
laws, revision of existing espionage law and repeal of the law penalizing knowing misrepresentation by witnesses in governmental matters. 29 0 No better
formula could be devised for indefinitely postponing penal reform. Such
brave progressive words meant, in the real world of legislation, a reactionary
refusal to move forward. As for less responsible journals and journalists, the
prospect of compromise had them foaming at the mouth. The Los Angeles
Vanguard of June 4, 1976 headlined a five column article entitled "Fascist Bill
285. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, supra note 192. at 6 ("No attempt should be made ... to set forth ... all defenses.").
286. COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATkS, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 7 (Feb. 25, 1976).
287. Memorandum, supra note 266, at 4-5. See Hart/Kennedy/Abourezk Proposal, supra note
266. Federal jurisdiction over riots had already been somewhat curtailed by S. I §§ 1831-3, and a
further curtailment was accepted by Senators McClellan and Hruska who agreed to delete "obstruction of a federal function" as a basis for federal jurisdiction. Memorandum, supra note 266,
at 4.
288. ACLU Press Release. April 8, 1976, at 1.

289. Morgan, A "Compromise" That Lynches the Constitution, Washington Star, Feb. 29. 1976, at
E-1, col. 1.
290.

Id.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 41: No. I

Creeps Thru Senate."29 ' The article characterized the bill, including pending
changes, as "One Giant Goosestep for Mankind!," "the most evil legacy of the
Nixon administration, Watergate taken to its most extreme law 'n order conclusion," and "blueprint for fascism." The role of the "so-called liberals"
(Senators Kennedy, Hart and Abourezk) was described as driving NCARL
officials "purple with rage.

292

Nevertheless, compromise remains very much alive. It is probable that a
McClellan-Kennedy bill, no longer designated S. 1, will be the vehicle of reform in the Ninety-fifth Congress.
V
THE MEDIA

With a few honorable exceptions,2 93 journalists and broadcasters defaulted
on their obligation to educate the public on the issues of penal reform. The

behavior of the Wall Street Journal, ordinarily a sophisticated paper, is illustrative. Responding to a letter from Senators McClellan and Hruska, 2 9 4 the
295
Journal published an editorial which focused on the offical secrets issue,
the length of the bill ("every Senator and Representative will [not] read all
753 pages"),2 96 and the desirability of "codification" as distinguished from re29 7
form (the bill "should not go beyond existing law").
The official secrets issue was indeed important, but to give it overwhelming prominence, as did most of the press, was also an act of censorship denying the public, at critical stages of the legislative process, intelligence regarding all the other important proposals in the legislation. 29 The proposition
291.
292.

Baker, Fascist Bill Creeps Thru Senate, Los Angeles Vanguard, June 4, 1976, at 3. col. 1.
Id.

293.

See, e.g., Conley, The Growing Fight over Senate Bill 1, Memphis Corn. Appeal, Jan. 11,

1976, § 6, at 1, col. 1; McKenzie, New Criminal Code, Washington Post, Sept. 29, 1975, at 1, col. 6;
Ungar, Reports and Comment: Law and Order Revisited, 238 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 12 (1976). 1 obviously have not made a comprehensive survey on this subject; but colleagues, former students, and
friends involved in the reform enterprise clipped the press for me, and called my attention to
broadcasts. I am satisfied that the conclusion in the text is valid at least for the northeastern
United States.
294. Letters to the Editor: Criminaljustice, Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1975, at 8, col. 6.
295. Review and Outlook: Senate 1, Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1975, at 8, col. I.
296. Id. The Journal appears to have adopted page count as its paramount criterion in
evaluating legislation. A lead editorial called upon President Ford to veto the [ax Reform Act of
1976 on the ground that it was 1500 pages long. The President was invited to promote his
campaign for reelection "by having his advisers draw up a tax bill on one type-written page.Review and Outlook: Veto the Tax Bill, Wall St. J., Sept. 14, 1976, at 26, col. 1
297. Review and Outlook: Senate 1, Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1975, at 8, col. I (statement from the
Montreal meeting of the American Bar Association House of Delegates).
298. It should be stated that the New York Times, as well as many other papers, gave comprehensive news coverage to the initial submission of the Brown Commission Report and to the
introduction of S. 1. But these early summaries, written before battle lines had been drawn, could
not supply the need later for reasonably comprehensive analysis of the fighting issues. The New
York Times at one point commissioned an article to survey the reform project, but found it too

Page 1: Winter 1977]

FEDERAL REFORM

that comprehensive penal reform should be rejected because the bill was too
long and would not be read by every legislator was, of course, ridiculous. The
Journal was doing nothing less than mis-educating its readers regarding the
democratic legislative process. If no bill could be enacted unless every legislator had read every page, legislation would come to a halt. Responsible legislators make up their minds on the basis of staff condensations and salient
issues exposed by hearings, lobbying, and public discussion. The president of
the United States, who must concur in or veto every enactment of Congress,
would find it impossible to exercise this legislative discretion if he were required to read (and think about?) every word in the tens of thousands of
pages submitted to him every year. Tax bills of greater length than the criminal code reform bills are enacted regularly.2 99 In any event, two-thirds of S. I
consisted either of conforming amendments that raised no substantive issues
or of reenactments of existing procedural and administrative provisions. Of
the remaining one-third of the bill, which deals with the new substantive
penal code, by far the major part was not in dispute.
As for codification-a mere tidying-up or editorial restatement of existing
law-it is enough to recall that the statute establishing the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws called explicitly for "revision," "improvement," and "changes" such as would "better serve the ends of justice."""
It would have been a waste of time and money to marshall the political and
intellectual resources that have gone into this enterprise over the past eight
years merely to restate existing law, an editorial job that the Library of Congress or any law publisher could perform satisfactorily.
A surprising aspect of the press coverage of penal reform was the extent
to which journals of no marked political bent opened their news columns to
handouts from the Left. A Boston Globe article reported that continued compromise efforts would cause Senator Kennedy to "lose points" with liberal
supporters and that the Senator had therefore decided to withdraw his support of penal reform through amendment of S. 1 .311 Similarly, the Detroit Free
complicated for the Times readership. It was eventually published in Gillers, Blueprintfor Tyranny:
Congress Overhauls the Laws, 222 NATION 172 (1976). The New York Times did run a short piece by
me in the Sunday News-of-the-Week in Review Section. The editors, however, made a significant
change. Where I had given first place to the sentencing reforms, to avoid the by-then-hackneyed
priority which the newspapers had been giving to the newspaper-pinching censorship provisions,
the editors gave my discussion of official secrets first place prominence. See Schwartz, A Proposal
to Overhaul the Federal Criminal Laws, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1975, § 4, at 4, co. 3.
299. See, e.g., H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The Tax Reform Act of 1976 was over

1700 pages long in the print passed by the Senate on Aug. 6, 1976. The Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 (H.R. 8300) in its second reading for the Senate, March 23, 1954, consisted of 875 pages

plus 418 pages of amendments.
300. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
301. Wermiel, Kennedy Pulling Back on Crime Code Bill, Boston Globe, April 21, 1976, at 2, col.
2. But cf. Editorial: Stop Stalling on S. 1, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Aug. 31, 1976, at 6, col. 1

(editorial in a paper which had strongly criticized S.1 now noting that the campaign against S. I
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Press urged Senator Hart to "prevent a questionable compromise from being
passed. ' 30 2 Harpers Magazine ran an article purporting to survey the issues
raised by S. 1, apparently without consulting anybody but the violent oppo30 3
sition.
There is much food for reflection here. The reasons for the media's poor
performance lie deep in the structure of our society, and there is enough
blame for all. Instead of blaming, however, we should ask ourselves what can
be done to encourage the press to handle complex politico-legal issues so as to
assist rather than preempt choices by the public. This is not the place to do
more than indicate lines of action to be explored. One possibility would be for
the organized bar or law teacher groups to provide a legislative analysis service of the sort that the Association of American Law Schools has provided
for interpretation of Supreme Court decisions. Another alternative would be
for local bar associations, guided and stimulated by the American Bar Association, to foster the flow of information from law to journalism through joint
committees which would summarize and explain local and national legal developments. Law faculties could usefully collaborate with such committees.
For journalists, three innovations suggest themselves. First, a tradition of
serial feature articles for handling areas of vast, perennial conflict such as
criminal law, tax law, environmental law and welfare law could be developed.
Second, education for journalists should include a large component of law,
criminal and constitutional law at least. Third, journalists' emphasis on the
importance of accuracy of "facts"-propositions that can be objectively verified 3 04-should be balanced by inculcating a sense of the "unknowability" of
many propositions in the realm of law, economics, sociology and politics. For
such areas journalists-to-be should have a mild innoculation of the lawyers'
"adversary system"; that is, they should learn to tell the story less in terms of
conclusions, whether of the journalist or others, than in terms of clash of
evidence, logic, and interest on opposing sides.
Finally, one may express the hope that general education, certainly at the
college level if not in high schools, would impart some sense of the flux,
compromise and growth which are basic to democratic law. A readership so
educated would demand better of the press.

,shows signs of continuing long after the fulfillment of its basic objective, which was to strip S. I
of questionable provisions ...").
302. As We See It: Phil Hart and S-1, Detroit Free Press, April 17, 1976, § A, at 6, col. 1.
303. Viorst, Nixon's Revenge: A Bill to Legalize Watergate, 252 HARPERS MAGAZINE 17 (Jan. 15,

1976).
304. One of the most baneful consequences of an undiscriminating adherence to this criterion
is the tendency of some journalists to publicize a tendentious proposition by reporting "accurately" that someone, particularly an "expert," made a declaration on the subject. The important
issue of the truth or falsity of the proposition gets lost under the surface truth that the declara-

tion was made.
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CONCLUSION

The prospects are good for enacting a new federal penal code in the next
several years. One may hope that the next drafters will start from the Commission Code, superimposing on it improvements developed in the course of
the Senate Subcommittee's hearings and studies. Tactically, it would be well to
shorten the bill drastically by separating out the substantive code for initial
passage, with a proviso that it should not go into effect until after enactment
of a companion bill embodying the numerous technical conforming amendments required to integrate the bill into the United States Code.
The new code will include few, if any, of the repressive features that have
been identified above. It will not, of course, enact the Left's entire program.
Federal law will continue to ban hard-core pornography, although federal
jurisdiction may be restricted to federal enclaves, to substantial multi-state
operations or to "engaging in the business" of disseminating strictly defined
erotic materials. The wiretapping law, if not dissected out of the reform project (leaving the matter to existing law and amendment by independent legislation), will probably be cut back. Capital punishment, given a new lease on
life by the recent Supreme Court decisions,30 5 will probably be retained in
some narrow applications such as killings by life prisoners, airplane hijackers
or political terrorists. Handgun control will move forward another inadequate
notch. The federal criminal investigative agencies may succeed in blocking the
Brown Commission's innovative proposal to confine them to matters of substantial federal concern. 3 0° The regulatory establishment zealously opposed to
pollution, adulteration, untried drugs and other dangers that beset mankind
but largely insensitive to abuses of criminal justice, will fight to retain criminal
liability without fault and to suppress the Brown Commission's model provision for sensible restraint in criminal enforcement of administrative regulations.3 0 7 The subtle problems of justification and excuse will be sidestepped.
Despite shortcomings, enactment of the new Code would be the miracle of
progress to which I referred in the opening of this article. Criminal law
would take a substantial step towards rationality and respectability. Maximum
punishments would be cut back in the direction of humane and realistic
limits. Penal policy would be subjected to legislative guidelines. Judicial discretion would be subject to appellate review. Modern definition and grading of
offenses would facilitate proper law enforcement. Substituting order and system for the present chaos of overlapping, inconsistent and antiquated statutes

305.
306.
307.

See notes 4445 supra and accompanying text.
COMMISSION CODE § 207 (dropped in S. 1).
COMMISSION CODE § 1006 (omitted in S. 1). The Left's proposal contains a provision

making no distinction between innocent and willful violations, prescribing six months maximum
imprisonment even where existing law carried a lower maximum! See H.R. 10850, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 1304(a)(2), (a)(3) (1975) (misusing governmental authority).
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would make it easier in the future to identify defects and make particular
improvements consistent with the overall aims and capacities of the system.
The federal penal law would become an influential and beneficent model for
state reforms.
It is a paradox that progress will have been achieved not only despite the
undiscriminating obstructionism of the Left that I have recounted, but also in
part because of those deplorable tactics. Had the program of the Right gone
through, as well it might have since there was so much in S. 1 that was good,

the price of reform would have been too high. It is improbable that S. 1 could
have been stopped by sweet reason in the political arena or in the press. I
reluctantly confront the perennial ethical problem of good ends being served
by bad means. Having nothing new to add to that endless debate, I take an
existential escape: the professor's role is to speak as truly as he can. He is not
responsible for enacting or blocking legislation. The civil liberties establishment, on the other hand, does have such responsibilities. Like an attorneyadvocate, it need not believe in the immaculate virtue of its client. There are
ethical and intellectual limits to advocacy, but the boundaries are far from
precisely defined, and "[d]etached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife. ' 30 8 I shall not cancel my life-long membership in
the ACLU.
One can dream of possibilities in legislation, criminal administration and

political leadership that go well beyond the range of this article. How refreshing it would be if the new President, as he signed the criminal law reform bill,
should declare:
This is not a Safe Streets Act. Criminal laws are a secondary, although essential, protection against violent crime, and the states rather than the federal
government are primarily responsible for physical security on the streets and
in the homes. Of greater significance than criminal law, in the long run, is the
confidence of all segments of the community that our system is fair and benevolent: fair in the distribution of income, fair in the assessment of taxes
and other burdens, benevolent in its concern for the vital needs of every person and benevolent in its respect for individual freedom. This new federal
criminal code promotes respect for law by its rationality, by its safeguards
against discrimination and arbitrary punishment, and by eliminating obsolete
and technical obstructions to effective law enforcement. Along with other reforms, it may make a contribution to a more tranquil life in city and countryside. We don't know that it will because, despite prodigious efforts in universities and government, the causes of crime are very poorly understood and
"cures" for crime virtually unknown. But if we cannot look to today's legislation to "solve the crime problem," we shall at least have cleared away ancient
and ugly grievances against the system.
This modest, and therefore honest, declaration might well be accompanied
by a few measures that would put future reforms on a solid footing. Among

308.

Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921) (Holmes, T.).
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these, the highest priority might be given to establishing a credible system of
criminal statistics. The existing system is a scandal.3 09 It depends almost exclusively on crimes reported to the police or on arrest statistics. The very categories used in reporting crimes-larceny, robbery, burglary, fraud-embrace
such a broad range of behavior, from the trivial to the most dangerous, that
reporting in such categories reflects the nature and gravity of crime only with
intolerable margins of error. 31 0 Since the overwhelming majority of crimes are
not reported to police, since the number of arrests made is largely a function
of fluctuating police policy, and since the numbers have frequently been manipulated by reporting police departments to make themselves look better, the
country is operating in a state of basic ignorance. We cannot be sure, for
example, how much of the huge reported increase in crime in recent years
reflects changes in the reporting system, monetary inflation that converts
formerly petty thefts into reportable felonies, or even such beneficient developments as a greater readiness of Blacks, emerging into the mainstream of
American life, to report crimes to the police. It is time to establish a national
crime census, based on scientific sampling of the general population, to ascertain the number of actual victimizations in a given period.3 1 1 Such data could
be supplemented by reports from employers, insurance companies and other
institutions, and from the armed forces, regarding those vast pools of unreported theft and aggression on the docks, in the warehouses, in the banks and
in department stores. It is only by regarding the phenomenon of crime with
unflinching concentration and acceptance of the full truth-as if we were
epidemiologists bent on wiping out smallpox in India-that we can aspire to
understanding and control.
Other promising paths of advance would include: (1) providing further
guidance for the exercise of judicial discretion in sentencing by developing
"presumptive sentences" for typical situations, along lines recently advocated
by Senators Kennedy and Hart; 1" (2) creating in the Department of Justice a
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AND
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OF JUSTICE,

supra note 11, at 20-27 (1967); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND
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123-37 (1967).

310.

A scientific approach to measuring the severity of offenses has begun. See T. SELLIN &
M. WOLFGANG, THE MEASUREMENT OF DEUNQUENCY (1964); Wolfgang, Figlio & Thornberry,
Comparative Community Standards and Perceptions of Seriousness (major pending study fi-

nanced by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration).
311. Cf. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT

AND

ADMINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE,

supra note 11, at 20 (results of first national survey of crime victimization). See also UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION
JUSTICE INFORMATION AND STATISTICS SERVICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION
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IN THE UNITED STATES

-A NATIONAL CRIME PANEL SURVEY REPORT (1976) (comparison of victimization rates for 1973
and 1974).
312. S. 204, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976). Cf. M. FRANREL, supra note 48, at 111-15 (mitigating
sentencing factors should be uniformly codified); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, TASK FORCE ON
CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976) (directed by Prof. Alan Der-
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permanent criminal justice research unit to follow the legislative, judicial and
administrative developments throughout the nation and the world, and to act
as a clearinghouse for information and suggestions to the states; (3) experimenting with the correctional system by, for example, making disciplined
labor on public works the central experience; (4) developing some alternative
to the faltering juvenile delinquency laws for removing violent young aggressives from the environments which they terrorize; and (5) introducing into
the law of justification and excuse the concept of a margin for non-criminal
error. 313
As Mr. Justice Brandeis said long ago, "If we would guide by the light of
31 4
reason, we must let our minds be bold.1

EPILOGUE

The McClellan-Kennedy bill, S. 1437, introduced in the ninety-sixth Congress on May 2, 1977, embodied the 1976 compromise discussed in my essay,
incorporated an attractive but potentially controversial innovation in sentencing law, and was received with less than enthusiasm by the Left and the Press.
At hearings before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, begun June 7, 1977, Attorney General Griffin B. Bell
declared unequivocally the Carter Administration's support of the bill. The
Chairman of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws,
Edmund G. (Pat) Brown, former Governor of California, and 1, as Director
of the Commission, strongly supported the bill, although my statement included a list of things remaining to be accomplished: "An Agenda for Further
Reforms." The House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, under its new chairman, Congressman James R. Mann of South Carolina, met to consider the new situation and heard testimony from Senator
Kennedy among others. Disappointingly, some members of the Subcommittee
seemed uncertain as to whether the goal should be the enactment of a code or

showitz); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976).
313. See COMMISSION CODE § 608 (dropped in S. 1 § 520). Under present law, for example,
a person who would have been justified in shooting in self-defense or shooting a nighttime intruder may be convicted of criminal homicide if he was marginally hasty or marginally "unreasonable" in his appraisal of the situation. Such a legal arrangement makes the difference between
heroism and criminality paper-thin. The criminal law is more properly reserved for egregious
misbehavior. Compare the difference between negligence for purposes of tort recovery and
criminal negligence, or between civil and criminal fraud. That principle of frugality in the use
of criminal sanctions is as apt on the justification issues as it is on the prohibition issues.
314. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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only a piecemeal, serial amendment of the present chaotic title 18 of the
United States Code.
Senator Kennedy's proposed innovation in sentencing is set forth in part
E of S. 1437. A Sentencing Commission would be established and directed to
develop "guidelines" for sentencing and parole. The guidelines would be
strongly influenced by the gravity of the offense, but would also reflect a
variety of mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Federal judges would
not be bound to sentence within the ranges set in the Commission's guidelines, but they would have to state their reasons for not doing so, and sentences
outside the guidelines would be appealable. The bill superimposes the guidelines arrangement on the more-or-less conventional parole system but it was
made quite explicit at the Senate Subcommittee hearings that parole is to be
replaced by judicial sentencing under guidelines when these guidelines are
forthcoming. The rationale for the change is that expectations of rehabilitating criminals through indeterminate sentences and parole have proved illusory, and that uncertainty about the period of incarceration is demoralizing for prisoners. One can admire the creativity of this proposal without being
certain, at this stage, that it is preferable to or incompatible with other options,
e.g., intensified reform of parole through a guidelines program similar to that
which the Parole Commission has already adopted. A foreseeable controversy
about abolition of parole might jeopardize chances for enactment of the Code.
Doubts as to journalism's capacity to handle complex issues like criminal
law reform have not been dispelled by responses of the press to S. 1437. The
New York Times ran a story on June 21, 1977, headlined "Press is Monitoring
Criminal Code Bill: Newsmen Fear Possible Limits or Intimidation in Writing
About Governmental Wrongdoing." The column-long article is wholly preoccupied with far-fetched possible interpretation, to the prejudice of reporters, of provisions of the bill that do not change existing law. Everything
else in the bill is disposed of in three buried sentences. One of these does note
that the Kennedy bill "bears little resemblance to S-1, which was denounced by
liberals as an attempt to destroy various civil liberties"; but greater prominence is given earlier to the snide characterization of S. 1437 as "Son of S.
1." Similarly, an editorial in the Los Angeles Times of May 10, 1977, although
grudgingly favorable to S. 1437, was headlined "for a monster, a better face."
S. 1437 would be a major advance in restraint of arbitrary power to
punish, i.e., it promotes civil liberty. Until ACLU and the press comprehend
that sentencing and careful grading of offenses are the central issues in a criminal code, prospects for reform must remain dubious. ACLU occupies a
strategic position; although it cannot hope to secure enactment of its whole
program, it has quite a capability for blocking legislation. It is well-financed,
intelligent, and widely recognized as guardian of the deepest American tradition. Large sections of the news media take their cues from ACLU. The Carter
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Administration, however well-disposed towards criminal law reform, has many
other fronts on which great battles are being fought. It is not likely to carry
through on S. 1437 if that means putting itself in the posture of fighting ACLU
as well as congressional lethargy and rightist opposition.
If federal criminal law reform stalls, it will be a demonstration that the
Left had misjudged the moment for shifting from persistent demands to taking the most you can get, or that it prefers the excitement and revenue flows
from campaigns of opposition over the achievement of real reform.

